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Dependent Disclaimers
Katheleen R. Guzman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Intent, delivery, and acceptance.1 The first two can be pressed at a
donor’s choice; with the last one, the donee can brake. In this regard,
inter vivos gift theory reflects symmetrical propositions: just as no one
can be forced to make a gift, none can be forced to accept one.
The same holds true for estates. Under the twin theories of renunciation and disclaimer,2 would-be takers may refuse to accept a devise
or inheritance,3 simultaneously rejecting a right to acquire and exercising a right to avoid. Such refusal again reflects evenness of form, for in
the very act of disclaiming inheres the enrichment of someone else. It
might initially seem odd that one would reject another’s largesse or the
status of being deemed heir. But ownership carries both value and cost,
and acquisition is personal choice. Refusal will sometimes occur.
* Earl Sneed Centennial Professor of Law, the University of Oklahoma College of
Law. LL.M., Yale Law School; J.D., the University of Arkansas College of Law. I thank
Mark R. Gillett, Liesa L. Richter, and Robert Spector for their advice and feedback, and
Darin Fox and Michael Waters for assisting in the research and preparation of this article.
Thanks also go to my Wills & Trusts students during fall 2016, who forced me to think
about many of these issues through coordinate and sometimes, competing, perspectives.
All errors are my own.
1 “The essentials of an enforceable gift have not changed in centuries.” EUNICE L.
ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 9:21 (2d ed. 2013). While that may be true,
a few particularities have. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 819 (2014) (noting, for
example, how delivery has occasionally collapsed from an independent requirement into
an evidentiary subset of intent).
2 Technically, the term “renunciation” once described an heir’s refusal to accept an
intestate share rather than a beneficiary’s rejection of a testate one. At common law, as
the heir was thought to acquire title immediately upon the intestate’s death, renunciation
generated two taxable transfers: the first from the estate to the heir and the second from
the heir to the next qualified taker. 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 49.1 (William J.
Bowe & Douglas H. Parker eds., rev. ed. 1960 & Supp., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed., 2013)
[hereinafter PAGE]. Most modern statutes use the terms “disclaimer” and “renunciation”
interchangeably, and the I.R.C. section 2518 treats them identically for tax purposes.
MARK REUTLINGER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS
78 (1993); see also C.P. Jhong, Annotation, What Constitutes or Establishes Beneficiary’s
Acceptance or Renunciation of Devise or Bequest, 93 A.L.R.2d 8, 11 (1964).
3 A “disclaimer” is the refusal to accept an interest in or power over property.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1102(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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Where the rejecter is also the would-be owner, the disclaimer is
both clean and direct, and is a relative commonplace within estates law
to attain tax efficiency or avoid a creditor’s claim. But less common and
more questionable is the situation where one person disclaims on behalf
of another. For while the fruit or folly of a choice about property is
readily acceptable when the actor will bear all consequences, it seems
less fair when costs are externalized,4 even less so when the third party
who bears them is a minor incapable of making legally binding decisions
for herself, and less again yet when the resulting benefits of disclaiming
seem to redound to the decisionmaker rather than the person whose
“interest” was “lost.”5 One should be just before being generous. What
is more, it is far easier to be generous with another’s money than it is to
so act with one’s own.6
With all of that said, there are circumstances where attempts to disclaim on behalf of another are both understandable and appropriately
to be encouraged, and yet have been denied. This is particularly so for
what I term “dependent disclaimers,” which in their purest form occur
when parent A seeks to disclaim on behalf of minor child B, but where
the very existence of B’s property interest turns on a choice that A, as
yet technically, has not made. More casually stated, they arise when the
interest disclaimed remains but an expectancy, or less – and as when a
parent conditions her own disclaimer of interest on her non-heir descendant’s as well. Both the interest disclaimed and the person disclaiming
are thus dependent on someone, or something, else.
4 Life estates versus fees provide a ready example. With the former, the doctrine
of waste curbs opportunistic behavior by charging the life tenant with depreciation or
loss. On the thinking that lost value will present at lease or sale, no such doctrine limits
the ability of the absolute fee owner to treat the property exactly as (legally) desired.
“Property promotes autonomy, security, the ability to make long-term plans, the right to
be different. If I temporarily transfer possession of some thing to someone else, through
a lease or a life estate, I am entitled to receive the same thing back. This protects my
subjective expectations about the thing—my plans for its use in the future—without regard to whether these expectations or plans make sense from anyone else’s perspective.”
Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American
Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2011).
5 Technically, the disclaimant is the person whose interest is disclaimed, and is not
necessarily the same as the “person making the disclaimer,” who may be a guardian,
conservator, or other fiduciary. Id. See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1102(1) & cmt.
6 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1959)
with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-302 (noting the shift from investment standards tracking
what a prudent person would do with her own money to those acts undertaken by a
person of prudence in dealing with the property of another). See generally Edward C.
Halbach Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 407, 410 (1992) (explaining that individuals should make investments only “as a prudent man would make of his own property”).
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The issue, which exists somewhat fitfully, finds most recent expression in the New York state case of In re Friedman.7 In rejecting the
parent/guardian’s understandable attempt to disclaim on behalf of her
infant,8 Friedman surfaces the tensions of wealth transfer tax assessment
and avoidance through a stilted “best interests” policy lens as well as a
flawed perception of property writ large. This is unfortunate on many
levels, particularly as a more careful analysis of such foundational issues
can be easily lost in a tax policy haze.
After reviewing extant disclaimer doctrine in Part II, Part III employs Friedman and similar cases to assert the paradoxical debility of
joining a capacious view of “property interests” with a straitened one of
“best interests” within the dependent disclaimer attempt. Stated differently, for reasons both ranging and slight, most such disclaimers should
work. After suggesting possibilities for planning, litigation strategy, and
reform in Part IV, Part V concludes.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW

OF

DISCLAIMERS

A. What Is a Disclaimer?
A disclaimer is little more than refusal to accept proffered property,
and is the preferred term when set against an attempted transfer of a
testate or intestate share.9 For example, were X to die intestate survived by children A, B and C as sole heirs, C could disclaim her interest,
leaving A and B to take the entire estate. Critically, C is not treated as
having transferred her 1/3 share to her siblings, as would have happened
7 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 846 (Sur. Ct. 2015). The Friedman case seems to have touched a
slight nerve, appearing in assorted publications as a notable recent development. See
Gerry W. Beyer, Keeping Current-Probate, 29 PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2015, at 21, 26;
Jeffrey N. Pennell, Notable State Law Developments SY003 ALI-CLE 203 (ALI-CLE
course materials, July 7-8, 2016) (Westlaw).
8 Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 846-47.
9 Of course, disclaimers are possible for other inchoate interests as well, such as the
survivorship right in jointly held real estate or an interest in a joint bank account. See,
e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 646-47
(1989) (exploring the tensions inherent in creditors’ rights against successors’ rights to
disclaim, elect against a will, or pursue a will contest). For a sustained analysis of all
aspects of disclaimers in theory and operation, see id. at 591-92; Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1873 (2014) (assessing the utility of a
unified response, under federal law, to circumstances where disclaimers involve federal
debts, plans or programs); Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimer Law and UDPIA’s Unintended
Consequences, 36 EST. PLAN. 34, 34 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Unintended Consequences] (observing the mismatch between intended policy and drafted provision under
the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act); Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of
Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109,
110-11 (2001).
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had they agreed to this alternate plan before distribution had occurred,10
or were C to have accepted her interest and then given it to the others
thereafter.11 Instead, C is seen as having predeceased the decedent with
respect to the disclaimed interest,12 thus functionally never having acquired it and leaving the chips to fall to the other estate successors
where they may.13
10 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (recognizing
private agreements among successors but noting that they are “[s]ubject to the rights of
creditors and taxing authorities”); Estate of McNicholas v. State, 580 N.E.2d 978, 981
(Ind. App. 1991) (inheritance tax based upon will bequests, not family-designed redistribution of same); Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div. v. Estate of Pickerill,
855 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (Ind. T.C. 2006) (“assets . . . distributed based on a family settlement agreement . . . [do not] constitute a transfer made by the decedent; rather a family
settlement agreement is a contract to transfer property from one living person to another,
subsequent to the transfer of property made by the decedent under his Will.”).
11 Once accepted, the property becomes that of the donee and may no longer be
disclaimed. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1113. Of course, what constitutes an
“acceptance” is a question of fact for the court to determine. See Jhong, supra note 2, at
15; PAGE, supra note 2, § 49.9. “[R]efusal to accept would leave it part of the testator’s
residuary estate. But the refusal must be absolute and unqualified, not merely in word
but in deed. However positive the terms of refusal, they may be made ineffective by
conduct inconsistent with a refusal such as acts of dominion over the property. A gift to
another is unquestionably such an act, since it is only by virtue of the bequest that it can
be thus disposed of.” In re Zindel’s Estate, 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 282, 291 (1982) (quoting
Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 23 Pa. Super. 321, 322 (1903)).
12 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1106(b)(3) (stating that a disclaimed interest
passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the time for distribution of the
interest); JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE
PLANNING § 12.32 (2009) (“A disclaimed interest in property generally passes as if the
disclaimant had predeceased the attempt to transfer the property to him or her.”).
13 Where the decedent dies intestate, either the decedent’s entire estate or the disclaimed interest alone will then pass to the other heirs, with representation. For example,
in Webb v. Webb, 301 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1983), the decedent’s son (the disclaimant)
disclaimed his intestate interest under the understanding that it would thereby pass to his
mother (decedent’s spouse) and enjoy marital deduction protection. The disclaimed interest instead descended to his minor daughter via representation, just as if disclaimant
had actually (rather than virtually) predeceased. The disclaimant was left with no recourse other than to sue his attorney for malpractice for failing to discern the effect that
disclaimer would have.
By contrast, where the decedent dies testate or leaves property through a different donative form, the disclaimed interest will generally pass according to the terms of the governing instrument (which may or may not expressly state the effect of disclaimer on the
distributive plan). For example, a residuary clause might cover “the rest and residue of
the decedent’s estate, including any failed, lapsed, or disclaimed interests,” in which case
the answer is arguably clear. For a will that is silent on point, a disclaimer could either
pass to the residuary, fall through intestacy, or trigger the state’s anti-lapse provision and
shift to the disclaimant’s surviving descendants. See, e.g., PAGE, supra note 2, § 49.12.
For an interesting example of a case where the devolution to be made of the disclaimed
interest is unclear, see In re Peyrot, No. 205265CV, 2006 WL 1919130, at *5-6 (Tex. Ct.
App. July 13, 2006).
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B. Why Disclaim?
Disclaimers are most often used to effect positive tax outcomes.14
For example, assume that the decedent’s intestate estate descends
equally to surviving spouse S and adult child A. S might choose to accept her portion of the inheritance and later spend none, some, or all of
it in favor of A, herself, or anyone else, and bearing any associated tax
consequences involved.
Alternatively, S could be financially positioned so as to immediately disclaim her interest, whereby A would inherit the whole. The
resultant tax efficiencies could include S’s preservation of her unified
credit, effectively permitting up to twice as much to eventually pass to
the son free of a gift or estate tax burden.15 Moreover, her disclaimer
could shift assets to one in a lower income tax bracket to the extent that
use or investment of the property generated income or capital gains.16
14 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID ENGLISH,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 390 (3d
ed. 2004) [hereinafter MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 3D] (“[M]ost disclaimers are
driven by federal tax considerations . . . .”); WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F.
KURTZ & DAVID ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 88-89 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH
4TH] (“Disclaimers are typically motivated by two reasons [tax advantage and creditor
avoidance]. Empirically the first probably explains most disclaimers.”).
15 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 combined the previously separate gift and estate tax
exemptions into a single “unified credit” applicable across the individual’s lifetime and at
her death. I.R.C. § 2010. Its adoption eliminated the estate tax on about 2/3 of the estates that would otherwise have been required to file estate tax returns or pay any federal
transfer tax. PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 12, § 2.3. As applied to the estates of
persons dying in calendar year 2016, the basic exclusion amount is $5,450,000, or
$10,900,000 per married couple. Rev. Proc. 2015-22, 2015-44 I.R.B. 610, https://www.irs
.gov/irb/2015-44_IRB/ar10.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). In 2017, the amount increased to $5,490,000. See I.R.S., What’s New – Estate and Gift Tax, https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/whats-new-estate-and-gift-tax (last updated
Jan. 18, 2017). The same result can be achieved under the portability features of the
deceased spousal unused exclusion amount (“DSUE amount”), which permits the surviving spouse to capture any outstanding, unused balance of the last predeceased spouse’s
unified credit.
As projected, approximately .2% of all estates of decedents dying in 2016 will owe an
estate tax.
J. COMM. ON TAX’N, HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM, NO. JCX-52-15 (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications
.html?func=startdown&id=4744.
16 Income splitting can reduce the total income tax burden within a given family,
particularly if it shifts property to one in a much lower income tax bracket or if the 3.8%
surtax on “net investment income” would otherwise come into play. PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 12, § 7.9. These benefits might not be captured, however, if the transfer
is to a minor child or full time student under age 24, in which case the tax on unearned
income might be assessed at the parent’s level. I.R.C. section 1(g).
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A quite different choice might be attractive were the parties’ financial circumstances flipped. A could disclaim, whereby the estate tax
would be computed as though the disclaimed interest had never been
transferred to him. Otherwise stated, the estate would pass directly
from the decedent spouse to the surviving one, thereby triggering the
unlimited marital deduction and, depending on the amount disclaimed,
minimizing (if not negating) transfer tax liability under the Internal
Revenue Code.17
For desired ends to be achieved, the disclaimer must work under
the applicable law, the specifics of which may differ. A disclaimer can
be qualified under both federal law18 and state law,19 one but not the
other,20 or neither.21 This potential for slippage is eased in jurisdictions
having adopted the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act,
where any disclaimer that qualifies under federal law is deemed to meet
the requirements for a valid state law disclaimer, whatever the local re17 When a legatee makes a qualified disclaimer that causes the surviving spouse to
be entitled to the disclaimed interest, the interest is treated as though it passed directly
from the decedent spouse to the surviving one. I.R.C. § 2518. The estate may take a
marital deduction for same. See I.R.C. § 2056(a); Treas. Reg. 20.2056(d)-1(b); see also
DePaoli v. Comm’r, 62 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 1995). Although I.R.C. section 2518 is
a gift tax section, I.R.C. section 2046 makes it equally applicable to a disclaimed legacy or
inheritance.
18 A “qualified disclaimer” under the Internal Revenue Code is one that will be
recognized as effective under federal gift and estate tax law. More specifically, the disclaimer must be an irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest
in property but only if–
(1) such refusal is in writing;
(2) such writing is received by the transferor of the interest, his legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property to which the interest
relates not later than the date which is 9 months after the later of—
(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in such person is
made; or
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21;
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits; and
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any direction on the
part of the person making the disclaimer and passes either—
(A) to the spouse of the decedent; or
(B) to a person other than the person making the disclaimer.
I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1)-(4).
19 For statutory example, New York law provides that “A renunciation made in
compliance with the provisions of this section shall not necessarily constitute a qualified
disclaimer within the meaning of section 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, or for the purposes of the taxes imposed by article twenty-six of the tax law.”
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(a) (McKinney 2017).
20 See, e.g., Estate of Monroe v. Comm’r, 124 F.3d 699, 709 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing disclaimers valid under state law but challenged under federal).
21 As generally would happen, e.g., if the attempted disclaimer took place after acceptance of the interest had already occurred. Id.
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quirements imposed.22 As should be obvious under federalism principles, however, the reverse is not equally true.23
C. Direct v. Dependent Disclaimers
Legal theory counsels that choices over how to interact with property, including whether to exercise the right to reject, accept, transfer, or
abandon it, is largely up to the individual owner. For example, donative
freedom (including in testamentary form) permits choices to be made
that are largely untrammeled by restriction.24 Freedom of contract, or
more modernly, transactional autonomy,25 reminds that parties contem22 The UDPIA has been adopted in eighteen jurisdictions, the District of Columbia,
and the United States Virgin Islands. But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1114 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2010). (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this [part], if as a result of a
disclaimer or transfer the disclaimed or transferred interest is treated pursuant to the
provisions of Title 26 of the United States Code, as now or hereafter amended, or any
successor statute thereto, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as never having
been transferred to the disclaimant, then the disclaimer or transfer is effective as a disclaimer under this [part].”).
23 MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 3D, supra note 14, § 83. For example, because
state law might permit a disclaimer at any time up until acceptance, the testate beneficiary of a future interest might have a fairly long time indeed within which to effectively
disclaim. By contrast, federal law would bar the attempt if being made by one over the
age of 21 if nine months had elapsed from the date of the decedent’s death. I.R.C.
§ 2158(b); Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3).
24 See Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction
and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 214-15 (1997) (quoting Irving
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); see also Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Tr.
Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 343-44 (Ky. 1967) (stating “[N]othing in the Federal Constitution
forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction. [Nevertheless,] [e]xercise of the
coordinate power to limit classes of beneficiaries is infrequent and courts usually enforce
testamentary dispositions unless they are contrary to public policy or positive law.”).
More starkly (and clearly too broadly) stated, “[I]t is of paramount importance that a
man be permitted to pass on his property at his death to those who represent the natural
objects of his bounty. This is an ancient and precious right running from the dawn of
civilization in an unbroken line down to the present day.”).
Although formal limits on testamentary freedom may be unusual, informal ones might
exist through such judicial mechanisms as will invalidation on formalities, influence, or
capacity grounds. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 272-73 (1996) (discussing effects of assessing will legitimacy through
prevailing social norms).
25 See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 313 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the mid19th century turn from the height of such autonomy to a modern view where contracts
often must yield to legislative and judicial oversight – on the “unruly horse” of policy –
over what constitutes an acceptable bargain). He perceives it as still true, however, that
“[i]n general . . . parties are free to make such agreements as they wish, and courts will
enforce them without passing on their substance.”
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plating one can generally decide how to structure their deals.26 Restraints on alienation are disfavored, which furthers the notion that
owners can self-determine whether they need or want to convey their
interests,27 save them, or lay them to waste. While broad, decisions
about property are not legally unbounded, and that actors internalize
most decisional costs and benefits will generally further rational acts.
Either way, competent adults, whether or not they are also rational, may
make such binding choices for themselves, and either celebrate good
outcomes or learn from their own mistakes.
Nevertheless, there are numerous instances in which (at times overlapping) categories of individuals presumptively need special property
protection, either because they have not yet gained, were never given,
have given up, or have already lost, that control.28 One legal response is
to remove donative or contractual capacity from the person or class until (if ever) the disability is removed and action, ratification, or rejection
can occur.29 Another is to appoint or permit a second person to act on
behalf of the first.
These issues pose unique concerns for dependent disclaimers,
which while technically falling within neither contract nor conveyance
categories, operate similarly. Irrespective of whether they want or
26 Basic contract principles reinforce that absent procedural rules (such as the Statute of Frauds) or substantive ones (such as incapacity, misrepresentation, mutual mistake, or unconscionability), courts will generally enforce bargains as per their agreed
terms. “The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give.” Melvin
Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 742, 745
(1982) (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 75 (1651)).
27 See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 532 (2007) (“The law has long favored transferability of property. Nowhere is
this more clearly seen than in the common-law rule against restraints on alienation.”);
Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1410 (2013) (discussing the simultaneous predictability but contextual flexibility of
reasonableness as restraint-limiting principle).
For an older, fascinating treatment of restraints on alienation, including their genesis in
feudal land theory and their broad early embrace, see ELISHA GREENHOOD, THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 604-27 (1886). Mr. Greenhood
recounts that “the genius of the feudal system was originally so strong in favor of restraint upon alienation, that by a general ordinance mentioned in the book of Fiefs, the
hand of him who wrote a deed of alienation was directed to be struck off.” Id. at 608
(citing 3 KENT’S COMMENTARY 506). Of course, this regard for restraints no longer exists, falling early victim to the Statute Quia Emptores in the mid-13th century.
28 These instances include infants, minors, wards, incapacitated adults, principals
under a power of attorney, trust beneficiaries, and heirs or beneficiaries to a still-open
estate.
29 Thus, for example, minors generally cannot make wills, nor can those who lack
testamentary capacity, until either becoming of age, regaining capacity, or acting within a
lucid interval.
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ought to, minors may not disclaim.30 Depending on one’s view, the difficulty thus posed is either eased or exacerbated by a common difference between federal and state disclaimer law, which tracks the two
protection options noted above. Qualification under federal law demands that disclaimers be filed within 9 months of the decedent’s
death.31 Nevertheless, under the theory that a minor beneficiary is not
yet old enough to decide to reject the subject share, federal law tolls the
9-month window for minors until the minor reaches age 21.32 By contrast, many states that have not adopted the UDPIA retain the fixed 9month requirement, but provide that a guardian may disclaim on a minor’s behalf.33
D. The Example of Friedman
The deceptively short case of In re Friedman34 illustrates both the
issues presented and the complexity of a reasoned response. The decedent died intestate survived by her spouse, two adult children, and one
infant grandchild (the child of one of the decedent’s children) and leaving an estate valued at over $6,000,000. Under applicable law, decedent’s estate was to be distributed among three heirs, with her spouse
taking the first $50,000 plus one half of the remainder and each of the
children splitting the balance.35 The parties quickly discerned that were
all descendant heirs to disclaim, the entire estate would pass to their
father (decedent’s surviving spouse), capture the marital deduction, and
nullify the $200,000 New York estate tax bill that would otherwise be
levied against it.36
30

I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(B).
I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2).
32 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(B).
33 In a break from prior law, the UDPIA and the Uniform Probate Code reject any
particular time bar (such as that set by I.R.C. section 2518) to instead provide that disclaimer is barred if, inter alia, the disclaimant has accepted the interest. Hirsch, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 34-35. See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1113(b)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). As the General Commentary to the Uniform Probate
Code’s disclaimer provisions reflects, the older uniform acts promulgated in 1978 (i.e. the
Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers by
Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act, and the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers under
Nontestamentary Instruments Act), the prior Uniform Probate Code provision of section
2-801, and virtually all of the state statutes that the UDPIA was designed to replace had
largely (but not completely) mirrored the time limit then newly set by I.R.C. section 2518
in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, i.e. had to be made within nine months of the decedent’s
death.
34 7 N.Y.S.3d 845 (Sur. Ct. 2015).
35 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(a)(1) (McKinney 2017).
36 Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 845.
31
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The objective sought would easily have been accomplished had the
two adult children, acting in concert, been the decedent’s sole descendants.37 But they were not, with the initial impediment to their plan being representation. Because there was a third descendant of the
decedent – her infant granddaughter38 – the effect of such dual disclaimer may have been that infant’s inheritance of the entire “descendant’s portion,” ostensibly carrying the same $200,000 tax hit as would
have been borne by her mother and uncle.39 As such, the disclaimers
would have left decedent’s children with no share of her estate, caused
zero to little increase in the amount passing to the surviving spouse, generated zero to little tax benefit under the marital deduction, and arguably increased net costs given the potential need thereafter to appoint a
guardian for the infant vis-a-vis the roughly 1.5 - 3 million dollars with
which she would have ended up.40
Undeterred, the child’s mother petitioned for, and was granted, a
limited guardianship of the infant’s property.41 Representing that her
and her brother’s disclaimers were conditioned on the effectiveness of
that of the infant,42 she sought authorization to renounce the infant’s
intestate share of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner’s rationale was concise. She maintained that it was in the “best interests” of decedent’s
distributees to renounce both directly and derivatively to avoid estate
taxes, and further postulated that disclaiming on behalf of the infant
37 Note that both of them would have had to disclaim to achieve this objective. Had
simply son disclaimed, half of his disclaimed interest would have gone to his father and
the other half, to his sister, with the opposite also being true. See N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(c).
38 Indeed, the granddaughter seems to have been born after the death of the decedent. In discussing the effect of representation upon the disclaimed interest, the court
cites section 4-1.1(c) of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, which provides that takers
from the decedent’s estate “conceived before . . . death but born alive thereafter, take as
if they were born in his or her lifetime.” Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 845. If so, this is all the
more reason to permit the petitioner to disclaim on behalf of her daughter, whom the
decedent had never met, and may have not known was in utero or otherwise in esse.
39 This supposition is informed by two factors. First, if the entire “decedent’s estate” would be redistributed as though both adult disclaimants predeceased decedent,
then infant would have been entitled to the entire amount to which her mother and uncle
would have otherwise succeeded. The wording of section 2-1.11(c) of the Estates, Powers
and Trusts Law, however, seems to limit the effect of the disclaimer to the “disclaimed
interest” rather than the decedent’s entire estate. Second, one would have to see
whether the state estate tax on property passing to any descendant (rather than a child)
was pitched at an equal rate.
40 UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1986).
41 In re Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 845 (Sur. Ct. 2015). “A renunciation may be
made by . . . [t]he guardian of the property of an infant, when so authorized by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the infant.” N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 21.11(d)(1).
42 Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 845.
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“has no pecuniary effect on [that infant, as she] only possesses a contingent interest in decedent’s estate.”43 Effectively shrugging, the court
said “no.”
The fact that if petitioner does not disclaim the infant would
receive nothing from the estate does not denote that it is in the
infant’s best interests to allow the renunciation, which is the
standard to be applied . . . . While it may be in the “best interest” of decedent’s distributees to renounce to avoid the imposition of estate taxes, the court does not find allowing petitioner
to disclaim on behalf of the infant to be in the best interests of
the infant, and finds that it is in fact against the infant’s best
interests to allow the renunciation.44
Although there is much to be said for directness, the court’s decision
was flawed.
III. JUSTIFYING DEPENDENT DISCLAIMERS
A. Best Interests in Context
1. Doctrinal Context
Through guardianship proceedings, states protect the interests of
minors and others deemed legally incapable of managing their personal
or financial affairs by transferring that power to another (the “guardian”) on behalf of the protected person or ward.45 Generally, guardians
of the property must manage the ward’s finances, including collecting
assets and overseeing their investment, disbursement, and sale.46
Minors are often heirs or beneficiaries. Particularly where the will
does not provide otherwise, the careful personal representative will distribute a more substantial share to a guardian or conservator rather than
43

Id. at 846.
Id. (emphasis added).
45 Contrast the looser invocation of the term to refer to the non-court appointed
“natural guardians” or “legal or physical custodians” of a minor child over whom they
have custodial rights, or the narrower appointment of a “guardian ad litem,” literally
appointed for the particular litigation or court proceeding. MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 4TH, supra note 14, at 660-61.
46 Id. at 660. The petition in Friedman reflects that there is a fair amount of flexibility in limiting guardianship parameters by scope or duration. Guardianship is a creature
of the state: state courts conduct the hearing and do the appointing; state law controls.
Unsurprisingly, there is broad jurisdictional variation, even over terminology. Id. There
is a limited degree of standardization, however, in that roughly one-third of the states
have adopted the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, incorporated
into the Uniform Probate Code at Article V.
44
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to the minor or his parents.47 Moreover, she will reject a disclaimer
made on behalf of a minor without ensuring that the person making the
disclaimer holds proper authority to do so and has followed all governing rules.48 Unfortunately, what little guidance exists about disclaiming for minors may end at that procedural level. It is almost as though
the relative clarity of state statutes over the procedures demanded when
disclaiming on behalf of another has seduced courts into focusing
thereon at the expense of locating, and then discharging, a more searching substantive standard. Federal law is similarly unhelpful, with the
validity of federal disclaimers and the determination of one’s best interests remaining at the mercy of the state. Yet as the court in Friedman
remarked,
The procedure for authorizing renunciations cannot be regarded as pro forma or ministerial; it is a significant responsibility. . . . It can only be justified if the State, acting through
the court, assures the ward’s best interests are being protected. . . . The court may, and indeed should, consider any
matter which may affect the ward’s welfare, including the possible future legal consequences of a fiduciary’s proposed
course of action.49
Paradoxically, the Friedman court’s remonstration is both enormously
helpful yet not helpful at all.
Guardians owe all of the duties of care, diligence, loyalty, and prudence that any fiduciary owes to those whose interests it represents.50
These standards essentially translate into the familiar obligation to act in
47 Id. at 557. State statutes might avoid the need for (and correlative costs of) appointing a legal guardian in instances where the value of the amount transferred is small.
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-104 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (property with value
not exceeding $10,000 a year may be transferred to, inter alia, “the person with care and
custody of the minor and with whom the minor resides” to be used for the minor’s benefit but without transferor liability for its improper application); see also UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 816(21) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (a trustee may “pay an amount distributable
to a beneficiary who is under a legal disability” to the beneficiary directly, apply it for the
beneficiary’s benefit, or pay to the beneficiary’s conservator or guardian, or custodian, or
custodial trustee).
48 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 3B:9-4(B) (West 2016). A disclaimer on behalf of a
decedent, minor, or mental incompetent may be made by the personal representative of
the decedent or the guardian of the estate of the minor or mentally incompetent person.
The disclaimer shall not be effective unless, prior thereto, the personal representative or
guardian has been authorized to disclaim by the Court having jurisdiction of the estate of
the decedent, minor or mentally incompetent person.
49 In re Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 846 (Sur. Ct. 2015) (quoting In re Scrivani, 455
N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1982)).
50 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-207(a) (discussing a guardian’s duty to “act at
all times in the ward’s best interest and exercise reasonable care”).
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the ward’s “best interests,” as independently and objectively discerned.
Except to the extent that they bring something to bear upon those interests, such factors as the relative stringency of the particular determination by contrast to alternatives, or the inclinations of the ward (or
others) vis-a-vis the decision being made, are largely ignored.51 Within
the context of appropriate dependent disclaimers, the grand question –
must, and if so, does, the requested disclaimer survive best interests review – is one that permits no easy answer.
As applied to children, the contours of “best interests” are usually
tested within abuse, neglect, and custody contexts, which will often include objective, non-pecuniary features in deciding what they even are.
As such, best interests determinations made within those confines can
acquire a certain rhythm and flow, for although no two such situations
are identical, generally agreed-upon principles can inform the guardian’s
recommendation in the particular case. Less so for disclaimers for minors, however, where mixed inter- and even intra-jurisdictional signals
cloud outcome predictability for even a straightforward plan. That little
guidance exists has led even the Tax Court, when confronting the propriety of a parent’s disclaimer for a minor, to lament that “[t]here is
nothing in [the applicable state] law which instructs the Probate Court
as to what factors must be considered when deciding what is in the [minor’s best interests].”52
Part of the difficulty may be that with disclaimers, the outcome
presents with more subtlety given that the issue will by necessity arise
within the powerfully triple-charged conflation of family, property, and
death. Of the three, the one on which legal actors and institutions seem
most boldly and authoritatively willing to speak is “property,” tempting
those wrestling with best interests toward a reductionist bottom line.
This makes the answer easy, depending on the eye of the beholder.
51 MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 4TH, supra note 14, at 662. Other models exist,
but seem generally pitched – at least formally – toward incapacitated adults rather than
minors. Id. Note, however, that Uniform Probate Code section 5-411(c) expressly notes
that the court “shall consider primarily the decision that the protected person would have
made, to the extent that the decision can be ascertained[,]” and shall also consider the
protected person’s financial needs, the possible reduction of estate, inheritance or other
tax liabilities, eligibility for governmental assistance, the protected person’s previous pattern of giving; the existing estate plan, the protected person’s life expectancy vis-a-vis the
extent of the conservatorship, and any other factors that the court considers relevant.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(c)(1)-(7) (emphasis supplied).
52 Estate of Goree v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-331, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 123, 128
(1994), nonacq., 1996-2 C.B. 1, action on dec., 1996-01 (Mar. 4, 1996). Although the court
may have been speaking broadly about best interests in general, the more narrow construction may be the more apt, given the particular issue before the court and the myriad
places and ways in which “best interests” for such matters as custody have been
explicated.
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Those who want to deny the disclaimer will stress how it removes property, improvidently and irretrievably, from the estate of the ward.
Those who want to uphold it will respond by underlining its tax-savings
utility in preserving economic value for broader family use. Perhaps the
question should turn more on matters of degree. Perhaps disclaiming is
good for the minor independently, or better for the minor than not disclaiming, or best. Perhaps instead it is “not bad” for the minor in the
short term, but optimal in the long. The problem, in other words, may
partly rest with how the standard is currently framed, which seems to
create a false binary between that single decision which is in the minor’s
“best interests” versus that which is not, when a more shaded standard
might encourage a superior, creative response.
This construct might exacerbate the tendency, particularly of nonparental guardians, to mirror their trustee counterparts in acting with
risk-aversity. Indeed, under the Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act, “guardians” make personal care decisions for the
ward’s person, “conservators,” for her property.53 The terminology is
evocative in suggesting that when dealing with assets, the primary role is
literally “conservative asset conservation,” which further suggests the almost per se impropriety of making any uncompensated “transfer” of the
ward’s funds (which, to the layperson, is what a disclaimer is). The
guardian is forced between two fires: ignore any broader benefit that
might inure to the child or family unit by refusing to recommend the
disclaimer, or endorse it and be vulnerable to suit once the child is of
age to bring one.54
53 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 5-101(1) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1997).
54 Unfortunately, and perhaps because of the existence of such remedies as voiding
prior judgments or reopening existing decrees, “little attention has been paid to whether
the person under disability can sue the guardian ad litem.” Martin D. Begleiter, The
Guardian Ad Litem in Estate Proceedings, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 643, 744 (1984). Depending on the rights and the role of the person who acts on the other’s behalf, barriers
might exist. For example, although trustees, guardians, and conservators are fiduciaries,
owing duties to their beneficiaries and vulnerable to suit for their breach, most jurisdictions grant the guardian ad litem, as an “arm of the court,” quasi-judicial immunity from
conduct arising within the scope of the appointment. Moreover, the guardian ad litem
reports its recommendations to the court, which is free to accept or disregard them
through its order, itself appealable. See, e.g., Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 331 P.3d 915, 921
(N.M. 2014) (suit by one parent “on behalf of the child” against other parent and GAL in
custody context barred). Perhaps the critical difference lies in whether and to what extent the guardian is viewed more as an agent of the court charged with serving the child’s
best interests or an agent of, or lawyer for, the child herself, such as when assessing
settlement issues. For discussion in a non-estate context, see chapter 12 of the 2013 edition of Linda D. Elrod’s book, Child Custody Practice & Procedure, entitled, “Representation of Minor Child.” See generally George S. Mahaffey Jr., Role Duality and the Issue
of Immunity for the Guardian Ad Litem in the District of Columbia, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
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There are several immediate options when considering the extent
to which dependent disclaimers should be reviewed: never permit such
disclaimers, always permit them, or permit them only after a “best interests” review. The first option is absurd for two reasons. First, it ignores
one way (later discussed)55 to view the subject “interest” being disclaimed, which is as no actual interest at all. If that is true, there is no
necessity to review what happens to “it,” including its disclaimer, much
less under a “best interests” standard. Moreover, if the interest being
disclaimed is indeed property, an absolute rule barring its disclaimer disregards the very fact- and human nature concerns driving the need for a
guardianship. The second option is much more defensible depending on
how the subject interest and the parties’ relationship to it and each other
is viewed. Again depending on how the disclaimed interest is perceived,
the third option may be best. No decision that intimately affects the
circumstances of minor children should be made lightly, with dependent
disclaimers no exception.
Nevertheless, “best interests” itself, as applied, yields wide variation, from a pro forma look at the petition or guardian’s report,
whatever its substance, through a near- per se determination that uncompensated transfers will never comport,56 to a searching inquiry in
which all factors are carefully factored and weighed. Which version to
push? One could analogize the entire enterprise to constitutional standards of review. The proposed conduct by a guardian on behalf of a
minor ward might rationally further the child’s legitimate interest, substantially advance an important one, or be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling one. In one sense, the entire “best” interests question
roughly and categorically assumes the strictest scrutiny tier, working
backwards from there in assessing the legitimacy of the proposed conduct. I propose a more flexible (if not forgiving) scrutiny, especially
where a parent is disclaiming on behalf of a child, with the disclaimed
interest ending up with either that parent or that parent’s ancestor, and
especially where, but for the parent’s identical choice to disclaim, the
child would have had no interest at all. Differently stated, if they are to
be reviewed at all, perhaps dependent disclaimers should presumptively
279 (2002) (observing, inter alia, a trend “disfavoring immunity” for guardians ad litem
who play an advocacy role). Note that section 5-411 of the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act explicitly notes that a conservator may make certain gifts and
“convey, release, or disclaim contingent and expectant interests in property[,]” but may
only do so “after notice to interested persons and upon express authorization of the
court[.]”
55 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
56 The Di Domenico and Horowitz decisions treat this approach as a virtual sine qua
non to conserve the minor’s property. MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 3D, supra note 14,
at 85.
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meet a “best interests” test, under which the onus to disprove their
providence shifts to some party with standing to object.
2. Friedman, Horowitz, and Goree: Situating Application
Through Facts
The Friedman opinion was short; its best interests discussion far
shorter. Unmoved and, seemingly, unimpressed by the “non-property”
argument to be made, the court chided that while it may be in the bests
interests of estate distributees57 to gain the tax benefits of disclaiming,
“[t]he fact that if Petitioner does not disclaim the infant would receive
nothing from the estate does not denote that it is in the infant’s bests
interests to allow the renunciation.”58
Indeed, the court took more than a neutral stance. It could have
said that the disclaimer was in the infant’s best interests, or that it was
not. Technically, it said neither. Instead, the court pronounced that to
permit the requested disclaimer was “in fact against the infant’s best
interests,” which seems to strike particularly hard at its propriety.59 In
reaching this result, the court borrowed almost verbatim from the 1987
case of In re Estate of Horowitz60 – a case even more disdainful of the
proposed disclaimer attempted, and itself worth careful attention given
that it supplied such a critical base for the Friedman court.
Testator’s will named nephew as executor and residue taker; if he
failed to survive her, the residue was to be placed into trust for his children, his wife to serve as trustee.61 Testator was survived by nephew, his
wife, and his minor son, as well as by her own mother.62 Were either
nephew or his son to take in their own right, their bequest would be
taxed at a Class D rate (15%) and generate inheritance tax liability of
roughly $26,000.63 By contrast, if both he and his son disclaimed, Testator’s mother (nephew’s grandmother) would inherit at a Class A status,
dropping the tax rate by 10% and generating a tax savings approaching
$20,000.64
As the viability of the plan was contingent on his minor son’s disclaimer, nephew refused to disclaim unless son could also. Applicants
thus sought appointment of nephew’s wife/trustee as guardian of the
property of their child so that she could disclaim as per state law. Note
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

In re Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 846 (Sur. Ct. 2015).
Id.
Id.
531 A.2d 1364 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
Id.
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briefly the position that the minor was in: he owned nothing before his
aunt died (as it was but an expectancy, and in a contingent interest at
that), and moreover, nothing thereafter (since his contingent interest
disappeared once the alternate one in his father had vested).
As though it were properly in question, the court began by grudgingly acceding that disclaimers may be driven by tax efficiencies, but
then swiftly distinguished the cases it cited to get there by noting that in
neither one had the court been asked to “affirmatively assist or approve
a disclaimer for the sole purpose of avoiding the payment of taxes.”65
The Horowitz court continued by asserting that other courts “have implied” that such action would be improper. For example, the court invoked in In re Zipperlein’s Estate,66 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to sanction the possibility of a beneficiary’s disclaimer to
reduce an inheritance tax burden. Critically, the beneficiary there had
already accepted the interest, which would have barred her disclaimer in
any event. But in marshaling dictum in Zipperlein in support of its ultimate decision, the Horowitz court tipped its hand over how it really felt
about disclaimers:
Justice Stern, in refusing to assist such a scheme, distinguished
the facts before him from other cases of disclaimer by stating:
“[that there,] the renunciation of the legacy was bona fide and
not part of any palpable evasive scheme such as that here suggested . . . .”
While passive acceptance of a disclaimer scheme may be
acceptable, there is no reported instance of a New Jersey court
having actively involved itself in aiding the avoidance of taxes.
Nor should a court aid in such avoidance except where there
exist most compelling reasons for so doing which do not exist
here. Although tax avoidance is lawful, there is no authority in
New Jersey whereby its courts should affirmatively intercede to
aid a plan when the sole purpose is the evasion of taxes.67
65 Id. (emphasis supplied). The court’s attempted differentiation seems like a distinction without a difference, for if a disclaimer is permitted and otherwise qualified, and
the best interests (if any) standard met, it should arguably matter little whether the court
approves the petition for making the disclaimer or approves the disclaimer itself.
66 80 A.2d 817 (Pa. 1951).
67 In re Estate of Horowitz, 531 A.2d 1364, 1366-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987)
(emphasis supplied). Note that what the Zipperlein court suggested would have been an
“evasive scheme” was precisely tried and completely endorsed by a later (admittedly
lower) court, which found not “a scintilla of evidence” that the disclaimers would be
inappropriate or illegal. In re Uhrich’s Estate, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 126, 127 (Orphans’ Ct.
1957). Note also that Horowitz was effectively neutralized (even if not expressly overruled) in In re Estate of Schock, 543 A.2d 488, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (“One
must be just in paying taxes due under the law; one need not be generous. . . . I hold that
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First, the court seems to have warped the appropriate standard
from whether disclaimer would be in the disclaimant’s “best interests”
to one driven by the “most compelling of reasons.”68 That is a difficult
barrier to scale, and without more information to suggest it, seems to
arise from a misguided perception that there was some great mischief
afoot.
More importantly, “scheming conduct,”69 particularly of the nonbona fide, evasive variety, is normally equated with illicit behavior if not
crime. The court seems as affronted by the concept of disclaimer itself –
where tax avoidance is arguably its policy- and I.R.S.-approved raison
d’etre – as with the guardian’s request that the court facilitate it through
a guardianship appointment. What a peculiar critique if so. Disclaimers
are permitted under federal law, which indeed, revamped its policy in
the 1970s so as to standardize their practice and catch fewer of its users
unaware of potential avenues for its disqualification. While one might
argue that its effects in Horowitz (passing property to Testator’s parent
instead of a spouse) militate against its favorable treatment given that
no marital deduction was involved, closer inspection weakens that argument. First, it involved a four-generation family. Shifting property from
a collateral descendant’s line to a directly ascendant one would have still
left the disclaimed interest within the family of Testator’s nephew and
his son, both of whom were descendants of Testator’s mother with the
potential to inherit from her.70
Both more specifically yet abstractly, tax policy is tax policy. Just as
the I.R.S. implicitly prioritizes marital relationships through creating a
just as disclaimers not requiring court approval are legitimate even if the sole purpose is
tax avoidance, so are court approved disclaimers.”). New Jersey recently repealed the
state estate tax, effective January 1, 2018. Inheritance taxes, however, will remain for
non-family recipients. John C. Mahon, New Jersey Repeals Estate Tax, 2016 WLNR
32351675 (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/newjersey-repeals-estate-tax.
68 Horowitz, 531 A.2d at 1367.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 454 F. Appx. 711, 713 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A]ll
conduct violating the tax laws should be considered as part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan unless the evidence demonstrates that the conduct is clearly
unrelated.”).
70 Interestingly, the Horowitz court ignores how the majority opinion in Zipperlein
actually bended property law to result in a lower inheritance tax burden. There, the
bequest was to a stepson and his wife as tenants by the entirety. Under then-applicable
standards, the tax rate would have been 2% for the interest passing to the stepson, and
10% for the interest passing to his wife. The court had three options: tax the entire
transfer at 2%, tax the entire transfer at 10%, or tax 1/2 of the transfer at each. In selecting the last option to achieve what it, at least according to the dissent, viewed as a more
equitable result, the court openly disregarded long-standing principles regarding tenancies by the entirety being seized by their holders “pur tout et non pur my,” or in indivisible form. Zipperlein, 80 A.2d at 818.
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marital deduction and by sanctioning disclaimers to gain it, similar relational ranking finds expression in variable state tax rates based on relational status to the decedent. Both differential rates reflect policy
choices that disclaimers should be able to achieve. One wonders
whether the Horowitz court would have ruled the same way had disclaimants been Testator’s children, had they all been adults, and had her
spouse survived. If the federal government allows taxpayers to deploy
tax-driven disclaimers, where there is far more money at stake, it would
seem that state governments would be willing to do so as well. There
should be nothing nefarious about intent nor action for that which the
law permits, if not encourages.71
The court finally reached the heart of the matter to claim (not without sanctimony) that all of the rest aside, disclaimer would not be in the
best interests of the infant.
If the entire residue were to go to the child’s great-grandmother there is no guarantee that this child will receive any
benefit . . . . The amount could be significantly reduced by the
grandmother during her lifetime; the grandmother could possibly remarry and share her estate with her husband; family relations could become strained and her grandson’s interest in her
estate reduced or eliminated; or, any number of [other] events
might [occur]. Moreover, if the child’s father accepts his devise, despite the increased tax burden, the child unquestionably
will receive some direct benefit from his father; it cannot be
said with any degree of certainty that such would be the case if
the estate devolved to the great-grandmother of the child.
While taxes may be saved by approval of this scheme, any number of contingencies could reduce the amount devolved after
receipt by the grandmother, thus affecting any benefit the child
might eventually receive.72
71 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kramer, 421 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (Sur. Ct. 1979)
(recognizing the tax-driven nature of disclaimers).
The Horowitz court also discussed the dependEnt disclaimer itself, proclaiming the need
for “strict construction and compliance” with the authorizing statutes. Technocratically,
the court determined that while the will meant that nephew’s predeceasing (or disclaimer) should shift the interest to the trust’s trustee, the state disclaimer statute only
permitted disclaimers by devisees, defined to exclude both trustees and trusts and thereby
negating any judicial authority to authorize disclaimer by a non-devisee trustee. The
court ignored that petitioner was attempting to disclaim not as trustee, but on behalf of
her minor child who was indeed the devisee of an equitable contingent interest.
Horowitz, 531 A.2d at 1367.
72 Id. (emphasis supplied). Tellingly, the court shifted from referring to the taker on
disclaimer as the “great-grandmother” to the “grandmother.” This suggests that the
court was thinking about the disclaimant as being Testator’s nephew rather than his son.
Of course, in that he was an adult, the nephew’s decision to disclaim would have been his
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The Friedman court agreed, constructing a suffocating little paradox
through the claim that “the parent won’t disclaim if child cannot, so it is
even more probable that the money will be there and the child will get
some direct benefit through the mother.”73 Echoing Horowitz: “[a]ny
taxes saved by the [distributees or the] estate cannot serve to overcome
the effect of making it more remote and improbable that this infant will
ever receive a benefit by allowing Petitioner to renounce the infant’s
intestate share[.]”74
This thinking represents a cramped view of best interests. True, an
interest held by an owner one step removed from a child is “closer” to
that child than the property of one thrice so removed. But that is not
really the relevant line to draw. Both are expectancies, both are nonproperty, and how odd to find disadvantage to B in A’s choices about
what he alone owns (which, in essence, is what the court has done).
First, every single possibility that could happen to or through the interest while in a more generationally removed ancestor’s hands could happen through a parent’s as well: he could spend down or dilute the
money; he could die leaving it all to a charity; he could bet the lot on
“red” and lose. No parent is obligated to give property to children during life or at death.75 Parental support obligations will remain whether
parents disclaim or not. What is more, disclaimers are less likely sought
anyway where finances are strapped, support costs loom,76 or familial
relationships are strained.
It is curious that the Friedman court chose to follow the discredited
view of Horowitz over its own sister court’s holding in Kramer,77 which
alone to make no matter the consequence, and again reveals what seems to be a bias
against tax-driven disclaimers as much as some concern over how doing so would affect
the rights of a minor.
73 In re Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 846-47 (Sur. Ct. 2015).
74 Id.
75 Except perhaps in Louisiana, and even there, only under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., How Long Do Parents’ Legal Obligations to Their Children Continue?, FIND
LAW, http://family.findlaw.com/emancipation-of-minors/how-long-do-parents-legal-obligations-to-their-children-continue.html (Last visited Mar. 7, 2017) (discussing parental
duties and obligations); How to Disinherit Loved Ones—And Which You Can’t,
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100424947 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017)
(discussing legal barriers to disinheriting children); Forced Heirs and Heirship Under
Louisiana Law, MY LOUISIANA SUCCESSION ATTORNEY, http://www.mylouisianasuccession.com/louisiana/forced-heirship/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (discussing the restrictions
on a person’s ability to leave property to someone other than one’s children under Louisiana’s system of laws).
76 Indeed some states would prohibit the disclaimer by an insolvent or bankrupt
heir. See E. Diane Thompson, Can A Beneficiary Avoid a Federal Tax Lien By Using a
Disclaimer?, VA. STATE BAR NEWSLETTER (Vol. 16, No. 2 1999), http://www.vsb.org/site/
sections/trustsandestates/summer1999b.
77 In re Guardianship of Kramer, 421 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (Sur. Ct. 1979).
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sustained a petition to renounce on strikingly similar facts. There, decedent died intestate leaving a gross estate approaching $400,000.78 As in
Friedman, decedent was survived by a spouse, two adult children, and a
minor grandchild through one of his living children. The children were
prepared to renounce a percentage of their share, shifting a half million
to their mother and triggering marital deduction savings. Again as in
Friedman, because the daughter’s disclaimed interest would have passed
to her child, she sought limited letters of guardianship of the property of
her daughter for the sole purpose of renunciation,79 after which she and
her brother would renounce a portion of their distributive share and
thus maximize the marital deduction.80 As she revealed, “[P]etitioner
will not renounce a percentage of her interest in her father’s estate unless a similar renunciation is permitted to be filed on behalf of the
infant.”81
The court granted the daughter’s application for limited letters of
guardianship and authorized her to disclaim on the infant’s behalf.82
The court essentially recognized that although it would be difficult to
rule that the infant should forego a right to receive something of value
without commensurate consideration, here, the infant would ultimately
not be foregoing the right to receive something of value, so it mattered
not that there was no benefit in return.83 From that perspective, any
money received would be pure windfall, as the infant had nothing to
gain or lose.
None of these questions are resolved at the federal level, in part
because the federal government defers to the state courts in determining
a disclaimer’s effectiveness. The closest that federal law comes is
through Estate of Goree v. Commissioner,84 which holds questionable
reliance value given its procedural posture and the Service’s subsequent
nonacquiescence therein.
Decedent died intestate survived by four siblings, father, spouse,
two minor children of a prior marriage (both of whom spouse had
adopted), and a third minor child of decedent and spouse. The only
heirs were his spouse and his children.85 Decedent’s estate was significant, with its principal asset close to $4,000,000.000 worth of shares in a
78

Id. at 976.
Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. Note that the reverse need not be so qualified, for if the mother does not
disclaim, there is no interest in the infant at all.
82 Id. at 978.
83 Id. at 977.
84 No. 21098–92, 1994 WL 379246 (T.C. 1994), nonacq. 1996-2 C.B. 1, action on dec.,
1996-001 (Mar. 4, 1996).
85 Id. at *1.
79
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closely-held family corporation that decedent’s great-grandfather had
founded and which decedent’s extended family continued to work at
and control.86
Decedent’s father was appointed estate administrator, and his
spouse conservator of his children’s property. The day after decedent’s
father disclaimed any interest he might have (or critically, be later entitled to receive) in decedent’s estate, spouse as conservator petitioned
the probate court for protective orders authorizing and directing that
partial disclaimers of each child’s intestate share be executed.87 The
probate court appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. After
hearing (of which no record or transcript was maintained), the probate
court judge entered the requested orders, which were duly filed and received by the estate administrator.88 Respondent filed a notice of deficiency, determining that the disclaimers were invalid under state law
and disallowing the marital deduction for any property passing to
spouse in result.89
Although remonstrating that little guidance existed for the probate
court in determining “best interests,” the Tax Court offered its view
over whether, when and why a guardian might choose (and be permitted) to disclaim on behalf of her children, even if ultimately to benefit
herself:90 accordance with procedural law; the desire to preserve capital
86

Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
88 Id.
89 Id. at *3.
90 Id. at *6. Although the petitioner’s disclaimer on behalf of her children inured to
her own benefit, I.R.C. section 2518(b)(4)(A) shields it from attack since she is also the
decedent’s spouse. Additionally, the court noted in an aside that there was no self-dealing here by wife in her role as conservator given (a) the appointment of the guardian ad
litem and (b) the court’s pre-approval of the disclaimer. Id. at *7 n.12.
Once held by the spouse, it is possible that the disclaimed interests would “directly benefit” the children/disclaimants, thus potentially disqualifying the disclaimers under section
2518(b)(3) (disclaimant must not have “accepted the interest or any of its benefits[.]”)
Although the court elided that argument, it should fail. First, any benefit would be indirectly mediated through the mother’s fee simple absolute ownership of interests disclaimed, to spend as she would then decide. This fee title should break the benefit chain;
otherwise, the court would be pushing a peculiar, if not perverse, concept of fee ownership. Loose analogy exists within slayer statutes, where the maxim that “one should not
profit from her own wrong” has been invoked in attempts to affect the downstream disposition of the murdered decedent’s estate. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burkland, No.
CIV.A. 11-5024, 2013 WL 327622, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2013) (where statute provided
that “[n]o slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result
of the death of the decedent[,]” distributing life insurance proceeds to contingent beneficiary, who planned to transfer them to primary beneficiary to fund her defense of the
homicide charge, would violate the statute and the underlying principles of ERISA).
Aside from the fact that disclaimer is not tantamount to murder, section 2518(b)(3) implies ex ante acceptance of the disclaimed interest rather than some derivative post hoc
87
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assets for children and avoid depletion through taxation or forced sale
to pay it; the connection between that capital, the multi-generation family company that it represents, and the other family members with economic interest in the company and familial interest in the well-being of
the decedent’s children; the unanimous support of all other parties to
the proceeding (including an initially dubious guardian ad litem) and the
suggestion that the decedent would have, too; and others’ testimony
over their intended bequests to the minors, indicating that disclaimer
would not leave them in economic straits.91 In short, to the Tax Court,
the probate court’s decision, while permissibly mindful of the tax consequences of disclaimer, did more than merely rubber stamp a tax-driven
petition (as the Commission had claimed).92
All of that said, much of the opinion actually distills to dispute over
the appropriate standard through which to review the trial court’s decision. The I.R.S. urged that Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch93 required
the federal court to review probate court proceedings de novo (although
by its nature, a “best interests” decision will entail mainly questions of
fact),94 which it claimed would have resulted in virtually per se reversal
of the decision to permit the disclaimer given that the lone benefit generated was to the decedent’s estate or his spouse, rather than to the
disclaimants.95 The Tax Court disagreed, explicating a taxonomy of
Bosch under which state trial court decisions should be given “due regain. See generally Estate of Monroe v. Comm’r., 124 F.3d 699, 706 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing that “one who disclaims an interest in property must do so without getting something in exchange”).
91 Estate of Goree v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-331, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 123, 128
n.12 (1994).
92 Id. at 128.
93 387 U.S. 456, 459 (1967).
94 Some have argued that the legacy of Bosch is at times more stated than real, with
federal appellate courts often disregarding the state court determination as but another
“evidentiary factor” in determining its review. See, e.g., S. Alan Medlin, Howard M.
Zaritsky, F. Ladson Boyle, Construing Wills and Trusts During the Estate Tax Hiatus in
2010, 36 ACTEC L.J. 273, 314-15 (2010) (“Bosch has concluded that the highest court of
New York, based on existing precedent would not have affirmed the friendly ruling of the
trial court, but Bosch involved a question of law.”); Paul L. Caron, The Federal Courts of
Appeals’ Use of State Court Decisions in Tax Cases: “Proper Regard” Means “No Regard,” 49 OKLA. L. REV. 443, 486 (1993) (“Courts of appeals have merely paid lip service
to the “proper regard” standard and instead have undertaken a reexamination of state
law, thereby giving “no regard” to lower state court decisions.”); and Paul L. Caron, The
Federal Tax Implications of Bush v. Gore, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 749, 762 (2001) (“Federal
courts have cavalierly disregarded the state court’s interest in being the final arbiter of
laws within the state.”).
95 Goree, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 128. Interestingly, however, in failing to appeal the
decision, the Commission later suggests that the probate court’s decision to authorize the
disclaimer would have passed muster under even de novo review.
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gard,” appellate court decisions should be “considered,”96 and supreme
court decisions should be “followed” when adjudicating property
rights.97 As such, the Tax Court refracted Bosch from de novo review
assessing “what the probate court should have said”98 into the metaquestion of “what the state supreme court would have said about what
the probate court did say.”99 Applying this approach, the Tax Court
determined that it must affirm the probate court unless its findings were
“plainly and palpably erroneous,”100 which would be a hard review standard to clear and one that, at least to the Tax Court, in no way described
the probate court’s determination.
As the Service is generally agnostic over how disclaimers turn out
under state law, its position in Goree signals a surprisingly aggressive
posture in challenging the propriety of the dependent disclaimers there
made. In addition to the Commissioner’s brave claim that proper review would have obviously revealed the disclaimer’s debility, the Service suggested in pleadings that the only plausible scenarios for a
minor’s disclaimer of a valuable property interest would be for a “dying
minor” who “wish[ed] to disclaim . . . so as not to add value to his own
estate”101 or where the burdens of ownership exceeded the property’s
value.102 As the court drily understated in response, “[w]e think that
respondent’s examples are much too narrow.”103 Moreover, the Commissioner filed a Notice of Non-Acquiescence104 and an Action on Decision105 signaling its general posture to Service personnel dealing with
similar facts. While the notice merely reflected the procedural issue
with which the Service disagreed,106 the accompanying Action on Deci96 And presumably, followed “[u]nless the court is convinced that the highest court
of the state would decide otherwise.” Id. at 126 (citing Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 127.
99 Id.
100 Id. (seemingly limited to Alabama law and review of arbitral awards involving
labor unions). See, e.g., Local Union 1785, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Quarto Min.
Co., No. 87-3027, 1988 WL 41973, at *1 (6th Cir. May 4,1988) (discussing how an arbitration award must be applies unless it is “plainly and palpably erroneous”).
101 Estate of Goree v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-331, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 123, 128
n.11 (1994).
102 As might happen where the property is subject to an environmental clean up
action, or where real property is underwater on the note and mortgage.
103 Id.
104 I.R.S., Bulletin 1996-10 4 (Mar. 4, 1996), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb96-10
.pdf.
105 I.R.S., Action on Decision, CC-1996-001 (Mar. 4, 1996).
106 “Nonacquiescence relating to whether under Estate of Bosch v. Comm’r, 387 U.S.
456 (1967), the Tax Court erred in applying an appellate standard of review to a lower
state court factual determination instead of reviewing the question de novo.” I.R.S., Cumulative Bulletin 1996-2, 1996-2 C.B. 1 n.10 (1996), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GOV
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sion went farther, and both questioned the precedent upon which Goree
relied in rejecting de novo review107 and intimated that “friendly” proceedings yielding scant factual development would draw I.R.S. scrutiny:
[T]here was doubt as to the adversarial nature of the state
court proceeding, and as to the extent of testimonial evidence
available to the trier of fact. In addition, there was no factual
record available for review; the Tax Court was required to
make its own record, but then reviewed the state court conclusions of fact based upon this subsequently created record, using an appellate (palpably erroneous) standard. The utilization
of the palpably erroneous standard for review of factual findings in a nonadversarial situation is inconsistent with the rationale for the palpably erroneous standard, which assumes a
vigorously contested lower court hearing.108
B. Tilt Toward Best Interests Because of the Nature of the Interest
Disclaimed
1. Expectancies and Other “Non-Property”
Disclaimers are all about property–more specifically, “the . . .
refus[al of] a proffered interest in or power over property.”109 With no
such interest in property, there is nothing to disclaim. There is no need,
for example, for one to reject next month’s lottery winnings, or the profits that may be earned in a later year of stock trading, because there is
no existing right in either to be relinquished.110 The “rejection” of such
assets would either need to wait until they (if ever) materialized, or take
some other, more attenuated and precursive form, such as a refusal to
purchase a lottery ticket or invest in the stock market to begin with.
Chances of taking from another’s estate fall into the same category.
Such an interest, usually cast as a “mere expectancy,” is an odd piece of
elusiveness dancing on the brink between hope and high chance.111
PUB-T22-bd63dv36434dac055e3c4081794a375eb/pdf/GOVPUB-T22-bd63d36434dac05
5e3c4081794a375eb-2.pdf.
107 The Service argued that the Tax Court actually misapplied Bosch: “The cases it
cited in support are all distinguishable in that they concern the extent to which lower
state court legal determinations are binding on the Tax Court, not factual determinations.” I.R.S., Action on Decision, supra note 105.
108 Id.
109 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-1101 to 2-1117 (UNIF LAW COMM’N 2010) The
quoted language comes from the General Comment to Part 11 of the UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE, comprising the UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT.
110 Without an enforceable contract, such “interests” are non-existent. They cannot,
for example, supply the res demanded for a valid trust.
111 See Katheleen R. Guzman, Releasing the Expectancy, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 775, 775
(2002).
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Notwithstanding the diffuseness of its contours, however, one thing is
quite clear: the expectancy has not been deemed “property.”112 If not,
it cannot be disclaimed. True, the expectancy can be lost before vesting,
as where the decedent to whose estate it is sourced first writes a will or
revises an existing one, or where the person in whom it appears that the
interest will ultimately vest releases it back to a still-living testator. But
none of these occurrences amount to a disclaimer, which requires an in
esse right before it can be employed.
The expectancy unquestionably qualifies as property or a right
thereto once the relevant decedent has actually died. This is so whether
the interest under, for example, the subject will was devised as a presently vested fee simple absolute, a defeasible estate where divestment
could occur, or a contingent or otherwise speculative future interest
which perhaps, ultimately, will never vest at all. The key, once more, is
that with the decedent’s death comes the transformation of that inchoate potential into a fully existing (whether or not yet vested) property
interest.
These reminders, basic as they are, hold important consequences
within the dependent disclaimer field, particularly when assessing
whether and the extent to which “best interests” must even be engaged.
If a disclaimer is the rejection of an interest, and where the cost/
benefit of doing so initially and squarely rests upon the disclaimant, the
following basic disclaimers seem irreproachable:
1. A disclaims an intestate inheritance descending to A from
X’s estate.
2. A disclaims a testate bequest or devise made to A under
T’s will.
In each instance, A was to succeed to property directly from the
decedent’s estate, turning from beneficiary or heir apparent into actual
taker immediately upon decedent’s death. Correlatively, A’s interest
ripened from the non-property of mere expectancy into an already
112 Or as the usual formulation goes, “nemo est haeres viventes.” See, e.g., PAGE,
supra note 2, § 1.2, at 3-4 (“[T]he will is not meant to create rights in others or to pass any
interest in the property covered by the will prior to maker’s death. . . . [T]o revoke a will
is not to recall or reclaim an interest in another.”); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 86.1 (4th ed. 1989) (one is free to revise a
will, and the interests created by the will are “mere expectancies”); Adam J. Hirsch,
Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1083 (1996) (“[T]he interests [a will]
creates are mere expectancies, in no wise encumbering the properties it bequeaths.”).
See, e.g., Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian
Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 617 n.85 (2000) (discussing examples of
acquisition rights vesting as property on death).
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vested interest,113 with the only thing standing between A and ripened
acquisition being creditors and estate distribution.114 For reasons perhaps known only to A (and generally irrelevant in any event), A has
made a decision that will affect no one else, and will bear the advantageous, disadvantageous, or neutral consequences of so rejecting ownership.115 Legally, it does not matter whether the disclaimer would be in
A’s best interests or not, thus no best interests review is necessary.
Altering the scenario makes this propriety conclusion more
difficult.
3. A disclaims an intestate inheritance descending to B from
X’s estate, and the property will instead pass to C.
4. A disclaims a testate bequest or devise made to B under
T’s will, and the property will instead pass to C.
***
5. A disclaims an intestate inheritance descending to B from
X’s estate, and the property will instead pass to A.
6. A disclaims a testate bequest or devise made to B under
T’s will, and the property will instead pass to A.
Here, the interests created in B are similar to those that the prior
examples had created in A: they are interests to which B is immediately
entitled upon decedent’s death; having vested, they are no longer mere
expectancies.116 The differences, however, are important. In Examples
3-6, had B been a competent adult, decisions about disclaiming would
have rested with her. But here, as with any instance where one person
disclaims on behalf of another, the immediate costs of rejecting owner113 A few technical points should be made. First, under the common law, title acquired through intestate succession vested immediately in the heir by operation of law
upon the decedent’s death, whereas title acquired through testate succession only vested
in the beneficiary who had not prevented same through disclaimer. See, e.g., PAGE, supra
note 2, §§ 49.1, 49.2. Nevertheless, the distinction has been largely erased through modern statutory and case law such that the vesting generally occurs eo instante in either case,
and remains in only academic form. Id. §§ 49.1, 49.2 & 49.4; In re Bevilacqua’s Estate,
191 P.2d 752, 755 (Cal. 1948) (succession rights may be “changed, limited or abolished by
the Legislature at any time prior to the death of the ancestor”). Nonetheless, there is
always the possibility that through some other expressed condition, the testate interest
remained non-vested notwithstanding the decedent’s death. For example, A’s interest
might have been a contingent remainder following a prior vested life estate in another.
114 The value of the underlying interest is always subject to depletion (if not total
loss) depending on the intestate’s debt position. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902
(providing for abatement scheme where estate is insufficient to pay all creditors and beneficiaries); MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 4TH, supra note 14, at 350 (discussing abatement and tax allocation approaches).
115 Unless, perhaps, one who disclaims has a cause of action in malpractice against an
attorney who failed to apprise of the disclaimer’s effect.
116 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ship are estranged from its benefits, which legitimately inspires concern
over whether the disclaimer decision serves B’s interests. This is particularly acute in Examples 5 and 6, where A’s disclaimer of B’s interest
inures to A’s own ownership benefit.117 Clearly, a “best interests” review is warranted in all four situations. As later discussed, however, the
concern for B in either coupled scenario is mitigated somewhat if A is
B’s parent or otherwise already responsible for B’s care.
Contrast:
7. A, lone heir to X’s intestate estate, having not yet disclaimed her intestate interest, disclaims on behalf of her
minor child, B.
8. A, sole beneficiary under X’s testate estate, having not yet
disclaimed her testate interest, disclaims on behalf of her
minor child, B.
***
9. A, heir to X’s intestate estate, disclaims her intestate interest, and then disclaims the interest that thereby passes by
representation to her minor child, B.
10. A, beneficiary under X’s testate estate, disclaims her testate interest, and then disclaims the interest that thereby
passed through a disclaimer provision, anti-lapse principles, the residuary clause, or intestacy to her minor child,
B.
Situations 7-10 are classic dependent disclaimers, locking the parties into a prisoner’s dilemma of sorts, or at least a high stakes game of
chicken. Technically, the only way that B will acquire anything to disclaim is if A does so first, a decision entirely within A’s control just as is
A’s decision over whether to seek to disclaim on behalf of Minor B. But
if the original disclaimer is tax advantage motivated, the only way A will
disclaim for herself is upon the assurance that B can, effectively, as well;
whomever goes “first” could lose to the other.
Jarringly, Examples 7 and 8 seem to reflect useless acts in that there
is nothing in B to disclaim but the doubly contingent possibility of nonexpectant and conditional share. Before A disclaims, B’s interest does
not even warrant a name. It is neither a vested nor contingent property
interest any more than one might capriciously claim to hold rights to
some rich stranger’s estate.118 It is not even an inchoate expectancy,
both because it was not expectant in B to begin with and because on the
117
118

Creating self-dealing problems to the extent that A is a fiduciary.
Not that people haven’t tried.
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decedent’s death, it has already vested in someone else.119 If expectancies need not–indeed, cannot–be disclaimed, then what to make of the
wisdom or utility of imposing legal impediments to an attempt to disclaim an even lesser “something,” which borders on nothing? That B
can even contemplate that “something,” whatever its stripe, derives
solely and completely from the future potential conduct of A, who
should enjoy unabridged liberty to disclaim. For in these situations
(which are essentially the facts of the Friedman case), B as yet has no
intestate share or property interest, contingent or otherwise, at all.120
Without something to disclaim, there can be no disclaimer or similar
transfer, rendering overly fraught concern with its “best interests” motivation or result irrelevant if not somewhat absurd.
Although the chronology is flipped, the same effectively can be said
of Examples 9 and 10. Admittedly, B ends up with an interest (however
conditional or short-lived) by virtue of A’s already having exercised the
right to disclaim. Nevertheless, as with Examples 7-8 and unlike Examples 3-6, the singular reason that that interest in B even arises again
owes to what A has done, rather than what and to whom the original
decedent had hoped to effect. The careful parent or guardian should
either make her disclaimer expressly conditional on the validity of her
child’s,121 or make no disclaimer of her own interest at all without first
securing the effectiveness of the subsequent and dependent one. That
said, given the circumstances through which B arrived at her interest, A
119 One might think of an expectancy as that which would result if the status quo
remained: the heir apparent’s interest if the erstwhile decedent never writes a will, or the
presumptive beneficiary’s interest if an existing will is not changed. This interest in B is
even more fragile than either, because it can be viewed as that which would result if the
status quo were actually changed, i.e. were A affirmatively to disclaim that to which A
has become entitled.
120 Absent unique jurisdictional terminology, to the extent that the Friedman parties
or court suggested otherwise, they would be wrong. See, e.g., In re Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d
845, 846 (Sur. Ct. 2015) (characterizing petitioner/parent’s assertion that renunciation
would have “no pecuniary effect on the infant as the infant only possesses a contingent
interest in Decedent’s estate”) (emphasis supplied).
121 That is the position that the parent took in Friedman, as well as the parent in In re
Guardianship of Kramer, 421 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (Sur. Ct. 1979). The Kramer court explicitly noted the issue:
It is true that as a general rule, a court will not issue a ruling relative to a hypothetical contingency which might never arise. Nevertheless, the law is not so
harsh as to require a person to act at his own peril in each and every instance. . . . In the instant matter, petitioner is not requesting a determination
upon an issue which might never arise. She is requesting authority to perform
an act that is an intrinsic part of a plan that will become immediately operational if she receives this authority. . . . The issue presented is far from premature. A need for its determination is pragmatically immediate, if not legally
present until after petitioner actually renounces.

188

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:159

– particularly if the ultimate effect of doubly disclaiming is the passage
of property through to an ancestor of both – should have a virtually
unbounded right to disclaim on behalf of B with no best interests review
or at least but a minor one, under a standard easily passed. At some
oddly circuitous level, it is actually but A’s right, and not B’s, that A
gives up through either dependent disclaimer.
That Friedman effectively disagreed does not mean that all courts
have done, or would do, the same. Indeed, recall that Friedman references but disregards the earlier decision of In re Guardianship of
Kramer,122 where the close parallels between the cases, both of which
tracked Examples 7-10, ended with their strikingly similar facts. Concerned that the infant would be “foregoing the right to receive something of value without receiving commensurate consideration[,]”123 the
court nevertheless granted the parent/limited guardian’s petition with
admirable conciseness and logic:
[A]t this time, the infant has nothing. Unless her mother renounces she will have nothing. Her mother will only renounce
if this can achieve a tax benefit for the estate which will not be
achieved if the renounced share passes to the infant. Accordingly, the authority which petitioner seeks does not involve the
infant giving up anything which she would otherwise possess.
All that is here involved is the infant playing a ministerial role
in a program designed to minimize the estate’s tax liability
without any real sacrifice whatsoever on the part of the
infant.124
The Kramer court hit the mark. It seems foolish to hand-wring over the
prudence of a parent’s dependent disclaimer of a child’s interest that
doesn’t even exist, worse yet to brood when the children do not yet exist
either.125
2. Releases, Advancements, and Satisfaction Compared
The second reason that dependent disclaimers should be permitted
as of virtual right is that their features echo a series of cohort doctrines
where a parent’s decision over estate-related issues–some of them predeath, some of them post–can bind her descendants with zero oversight
by a guardian, a standard, or a court.
122

421 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sur. Ct. 1979).
Id. at 977. See infra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes
a “qualified disclaimer” under federal law and reflecting that consideration received is
disqualifying).
124 Kramer, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
125 As where there is some sort of disclaimer on behalf of the unborn.
123
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a) Releases
As earlier described, expectancies are non-vested, inceptive rights
to a living person’s estate, disappearing on a dime with a change of the
law or the testator’s mind. Expectancies are neither present nor future
interests; they are not “legitimate” in the sense that their erasure can
trigger a taking or support an action for waste; and at least so far, they
are assuredly not property.126
It is recursively unsurprising that the expectancy may not legally be
sold or involuntarily levied upon: “[such attempts] are not recognized at
law because, the usual expression goes, the putative grantor has nothing
to assign or transfer.”127 Few may realize, however, that such attempts
are generally enforceable in equity, whether yielded to their putative
source through “release” or conveyed to some third party through “assignment.”128 The most common requirement asks whether the transaction was fair and supported by adequate consideration paid to the
transferor.129
Note at the outset the difference in timing between such transfers in
equity and the disclaimer. By definition, the latter occurs only after the
decedent has died and the right to the interest has vested, thus after
affording the disclaimant an opportunity to discern both the value of the
interest disclaimed and the likely identity of those it will ultimately enrich. Pre-death transfers are comparatively blind deals. Although the
releasor may have held some sense of the value of the (in)/testate share
relinquished, she will never quite be sure: for example, the source could
126 Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional
Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1571
n.69 (1982).
127 Id. at 1573 (1982). See generally 1 JOHN A. BORRON, JR. & LEWIS M. SIMES,
SIMES & SMITH: THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §395 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that expectancies are not assignable because “the grantor has nothing to assign”); Guzman, supra
note 111, at 775-76 (explaining that expectancy hovers between “hope and high chance”).
128 Guzman, supra note 111, at 778-79. I risk committing the very error that I elsewhere critique by presenting these transfer forms as virtually indistinguishable save for
the identity of the transferee. That said, the simplification is useful when targeting some
of the distinctions between the release and the assignment and between the both of them
and the disclaimer. Although the term “release” was traditionally limited to a putative
heir’s relinquishment of an intestate share to the ancestor, it now encompasses similar
action by a putative beneficiary of a testate estate. See, e.g., Ware v. Crowell, 465 S.E.2d
809, 811 (Va. 1996) (noting, however, that Virginia permits the testate but not intestate
release).
129 Guzman, supra note 111, at 778-79; see also RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: FUTURE
INTERESTS § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1940); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.6 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1999); THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 130 (2d ed. 1953); BORRON & SIMES, supra note 127,
§§ 394, 395.
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have suffered loss or enjoyed a windfall just after the transfer was accomplished, or decided to leave every penny, either way, to an unrelated
charity of choice. No matter the circumstance, the releasor cedes all
claim to the source’s estate. Here is the critical part: in the process, she
has also bound her descendants, whether they know of, consent to, or in
the eyes of any person or court, are well (much less “best”) served by
that release or not. Admittedly, assignments do not affect the rights of
the assignor’s descendants if the assignor predeceases the source. However, in surrendering the expectancy to the source rather than to some
third party, the release is much closer conceptual kin to the disclaimer
than the assignment, and thus provides the superior comparison
point.130
For example, assume that decedent dies intestate leaving a $30,000
net estate, no spouse, and four descendants: Son A, Son B, and B’s two
children. If both A and B survive without transferring their expectancies, they will split the estate at $15,000 apiece, B’s two children taking
nothing under the thinking that their interests are adequately protected,
in mediated form, through their parent’s inheritance. Had B predeceased decedent, his children would emerge unscathed, sharing his interest through representation and succeeding to $7,500 apiece. The same
result would likely accrue were B to survive decedent but disclaim
thereafter, without any dependent disclaimers on behalf of his children.131 Indeed, the same would hold true were B to have assigned his
expectancy to X at a discount, and then predeceased decedent, leaving
B’s children unbound by their father’s action.
But had B instead released to decedent, Son A would inherit the
entire estate, the grandchildren’s “interest,” attenuated as it is, completely extinguished by virtue of what B had decided to do with “his
expectancy.”132 Although the disparate treatment of assignment and re130 To be fair, the requirement that the source pay consideration to the releasor for
an interest that as yet exists only in the realm of possibilities and nowhere in real space
renders the entire concept of the release peculiar, and undercuts the utility of keying the
dependent disclaimer to its effects. Nevertheless, very few jurisdictions have abolished
the release, and its similarities with the disclaimer are significant enough to warrant the
comparison. See generally Guzman, supra note 111, at 777-79 (discussing expectancy
interests).
131 This would depend on the jurisdiction’s disclaimer statute. Some would redistribute B’s disclaimed interests as though B had predeceased the decedent, thus sending that
$15,000 to A along with B’s children. Others would redistribute B’s interest to his own
descendants alone. Still others might redistribute the decedent’s entire estate, rather
than simply the disclaimed interest, as though the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent. See infra notes 217, 219-21 and accompanying text for examples of state statutes.
132 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.6
cmt. j (“If a releasor or assignor predeceases the decedent, the right of the descendants of
a releasor but not of an assignor are cut off by the ancestor’s action.”). Some commen-
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lease may be puzzling, the more immediate question is why a parent is
held to a “best interests” standard when affecting the rights (or mere
hopes, or non-entities) of his children through a disclaimer but not a
release.133 Tellingly, the binding effect of the release on the releasor’s
descendants in no way turns on the releasor’s having shared the consideration received from the source in return for it with those descendants.
b) Advancements and Satisfactions
The effects of advancements and ademptions by satisfaction complement the analogy. In that they are early gifts of, respectively, a later
testate or intestate share, they parallel release and assignment by occurring only before the relevant decedent has died, thus affecting expectancies rather than already-vested interests. An advance is only counted
against an heir’s intestate share if there is sufficient evidence that the
decedent had so intended, which must usually be found in a writing.134
tary limits this preclusive effect to circumstances where other children of the source survive, presumably theorizing that the source would prefer the otherwise estopped child or
grandchild to take over more attenuated collateral relatives or share in the estate with
other descendants of equal degree. E.g., Pylant v. Burns, 112 S.E. 455, 458 (Ga. 1922)
(discussing how the relinquishment dealt with the subject of an advancement to the
child); ATKINSON, supra note 129, § 130, at 728; REUTLINGER, supra note 2, at 31; Jeffrey
G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 25152 & nn. 125-27 (1981) (explaining that the share of the estate should be extinguished as
to all claimants). Contra RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS § 316, cmt. f, illus.
6 (stating that the collateral relatives would take). For case law examples of the result in
assignment, see Schneider v. Dorr, 210 N.E.2d 311, 317 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1965). For case
law examples of the result in release, see Crum v. O’Rear, 24 N.E. 956 (Ill. 1890). This
distinction (release v. assignment) is commonly noted. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.6 cmt. j, reporter’s note 2 (discussing
difference).
133 The distinction is routinely supported by invoking Donough v. Garland, 109 N.E.
1015, 1017 (Ill. 1915), where an adult child assigned her expectancy in her mother’s estate
to two siblings, then predeceased her mother. When the mother died, the assignor’s
seven children sued for partition, claiming that they were not precluded from a share in
their grandmother’s estate. The court agreed. After reciting a series of peripheral cases,
the last paragraph of the opinion differentiates release from assignment by remarking
that the former “extinguish[es] . . . the right of inheritance, cutting it off at its source,
whereas the latter preserves the right of inheritance and specifically enforces the agreement once, if ever, the expectancy vests in the assignor. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.6 reporter’s note 2.
134 See e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (explaining
that a gift is treated as an advancement “only if the decedent declared in a contemporaneous writing or the heir acknowledged in [any] writing that the gift is an advancement”).
Differences do exist. In some states, oral testimony may provide the requisite intent.
Other jurisdictions create presumptions for or against such intent, leaving the evidentiary
burden to their disproof. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 633.224 (2016) (presume against); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1230 (2016) (presume for). At some level, any jurisdiction that
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While there are admitted outliers,135 the traditional rule for advancements is to take them into account when computing the representational
intestate shares of descendants of an advancee who has predeceased the
decedent.136 This rule is defensible either through a variation of the
conduit theory, under which the law assumes pass-through benefit of the
advance from the advancee or her estate, or through the belief that the
intestate would have desired to preserve distributional vertical equality
among her descendants.137
Ademption by Satisfaction is the testamentary corollary to the advance, similarly requiring that the testator’s intent be clearly expressed
in writing. Here, the Uniform Probate Code joins the majority of the
states to follow the traditional theory: ademption does presumptively
requires a writing for the good enough intent is implicitly creating a presumption against
the advance.
The advance might be perceived as being as much of an odd rarity as the release: first,
those who feel strongly about the distributional equality that advances are thought to
protect will presumably write a will rather than rely on intestate succession and its associated advance doctrine. Second, few advancers will have the presence of mind to write a
contemporaneous statement of advance, and instead, would simply write a will. Third,
rational self-interest assures that few advancees would have the incentive to cast the
transfer as an advance in writing, whether contemporaneously with, or after, that
transfer.
135 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(c) (advance not charged against children of
predeceasing advancee “unless the decedent’s contemporaneous writing provides otherwise”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.6 cmt. h
(AM. LAW INST. 1999). The theory implicitly opposes presuming that the advancee’s descendants benefitted by receiving either part or all of the advanced share or its value
from the advancee or his estate. Of course, the advance is charged against the donee’s
descendants if the decedent’s contemporaneous writing so provided or if the descendant
was the specific advancee herself.
136 See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 129, § 129, at 722; BORRON & SIMES, supra note
127, § 394 at 423-24 (noting English and American common law). For legislative examples, see 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-5 (2016) (“[I]f [the advancee] die[s] before the decedent, [the advancement is applied] on the share of the descendants of the person to
whom the advancement was made.”); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-106(c) (LexisNexis 2017) (“If the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent, the property
shall be taken into account in computing the share of the issue of the recipient.”); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 84 § 227 (2017) (“If any [qualified advancee] dies before the decedent, leaving
issue, the advancement must be taken into consideration in the division and distribution
of the estate and the amount thereof must be allowed accordingly by the representatives
of the heirs receiving the advancement, in like manner as if the advancement had been
made directly to them.”).
137 But oddly enough, the Uniform Probate Code does charge the value of a satisfaction, the testate analog to advance, against the descendants of a predeceasing donee who
are substituted as recipients under anti-lapse. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(c) (unless
there is a contrary contemporaneous writing by the testator); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.4 cmt. h (unless testator’s contemporaneous writing provides otherwise).
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count against the shares of children of a predeceasing beneficiary.138
Thus, for both advances and ademption by satisfaction, as well as for the
release, the parent’s action in either requesting or accepting an inter
vivos gift to be charged against a later testate or intestate share will
generally bind that parent’s children, and quite possibly, down to nil.
Again assume that decedent dies intestate leaving a $30,000 net estate, no spouse, and four descendants: Son A, Son B, and B’s two children. If both A and B survive without transferring their expectancies,
and had no advances been made, they would split the estate at $15,000
apiece. But further assume that before he died, decedent had made a
lifetime gift, qualifying as an advance, of $30,000 to B.
Under traditional advance theory, B would not be entitled to take
from decedent’s estate. Since B’s advance equaled the amount to which
he would have been entitled under advancement theory, B is no longer
permitted any additional share.139 But what if B had predeceased the
decedent, leaving two children who might represent him in calculating
an intestate share? Were B’s advance no longer factored, they would
split half of the decedent’s estate to take $7,500 apiece, with the other
half descending to A. But the majority rule does bind them to the consequences of their father’s advance, leaving them with nothing and
$30,000 to A. As with consideration received for a release, this would
be true regardless of whether they had actually enjoyed any passthrough benefit from A having received the advance, or not.
There is independent value in easing (if not abandoning) a “best
interests” interposition between a parent’s decision to disclaim on behalf of a minor and the parent’s accomplishment of the disclaimer on
behalf of the minor. Moreover, “it is almost as important that property
law be predictable as that it be right.”140 If cross-theoretical consistency
itself holds virtue, then the disparity between the standardless but binding effect of a parent’s pre-death release, advance, or assignment on her
children, and the impediments to parental, post-death disclaimers,
should trouble participants and observers alike. The distinction might
be justified on the reminder that death changes everything–that what a
parent does with an expectancy differs distinctly from how a parent acts
with an interest that has already vested. That said, it is also worth re138

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-609.
Specifically, B’s advance of $30,000 would be added to decedent’s $30,000 to create a hotchpot of $60,000. The hotchpot would be split between A and B, the decedent’s
heirs, with each taking $30,000 apiece. However, B’s advance would then be subtracted
from B’s share, cancelling it out and leaving B with nothing and A with the entire estate
(which is all that exists to distribute in any event).
140 Estate of Propst v. Stillman, 788 P.2d 628, 639 (Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Or as my colleague Bob Spector might say, a bad decision, if predictable, might still be a good decision.
139
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membering that in dealing with a potential interest that owes its existence to the acts of the one with the initial right to claim it, the
paradigmatic dependent disclaimer will involve a child’s claim that from
some perspectives is two times as ephemeral as that expectancy, and
perhaps should be treated no differently.141 Relatedly, it is anomalous
that disclaimer theory (which requires that the disclaimant be treated as
though she predeceased the decedent) does not bind the disclaimant’s
descendants, whereas advance, release and satisfaction theory, where
the ancestor/actor actually does predecease, propels the subject interest
that much closer to the descendants but nevertheless continues to bind
them.
c) Family Settlement Agreement
The family settlement agreement is a long-favored arrangement
whereby beneficiaries determine for themselves how to arrange estate
distribution.142 While it might seem unsettling that survivors are permitted to override either the state’s objective intestacy scheme or the
testator’s subjective wishes, they were always free to obtain that ultimate result anyway by receiving, then conveying, their predetermined
share.143 Moreover, these private agreements better reduce probate
and administration costs and promote family harmony than can pro141 Another possible explanation for the distinctions inheres in the concept of notice.
In either requiring evidence of the intent of, or implicating transfers (through consideration or gift) from the “source decedent” to the taker, releases, advances, and satisfactions
will necessarily be known to that decedent, who will then have an opportunity to adjust
her estate plan (including optional transfers directly to the relevant actors’ descendants).
Relatedly, if (as many do) the relevant jurisdiction limits potential advances to descendants of the decedent (rather than any heir), the source will know of the transaction.
By contrast, the same cannot be said of assignments to strangers, of which the source
might well be ignorant, or disclaimers, of which the source will always be ignorant, having
already died. Perhaps that fact legally ties those two dispositions together, shielding the
actor’s descendants by limiting the externalized effects of the ancestor’s conduct. Support for this possible explanation can be found in the doctrine of Ademption by Extinction, where a guardian or conservator’s disposition of certain property owned by a ward
might not effect its testate beneficiary’s loss unless the ward was aware of the disposition
and had an opportunity to react.
142 See, e.g., In re Will of Pendergrass, 112 S.E.2d 562, 568 (N.C. 1960) (finding that
[family settlements] are made in recognition of facts and circumstances known, often,
only to those who have lived in the sacred family circle”). See generally M.L. Cross,
Annotation, Family Settlement of Testator’s Estate, 29 A.L.R.3D 8, 18 (1970) and M.L.
Cross, Annotation, Family Settlement of Intestate Estate, 29 A.L.R.3D 174 (1970) (discussing how the law takes preference to family settlements of testate and intestate estates).
That the practice has existed for some time yields substantial state-specific statutory and
case law for the practitioner seeking to assist a client thus situated.
143 See, e.g., In re Estate of Webb, 266 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2008) (discussing
whether, as a party to the family settlement agreement, a trustee is a necessary party to
any action to modify the trust).
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tracted and acrimonious will contests.144 Some jurisdictions statutorily
impose a “good faith contest or controversy” prerequisite,145 but the
better view acknowledges dispute to be irrelevant to the parties’ determination to reallocate rights, and is perhaps only demanded when a
party asserts for some reason that no “transfer” actually took place.
A few observations are relevant when comparing the settlement
agreement to the disclaimer. Like disclaimers, they occur after the decedent’s death, thus after expectancies have already vested and correlatively, where more information about the extent and value of the subject
interests (discounted by the risk exposure and expense of a potential
will challenge or constructional proceeding) exists. But unlike disclaimers, agreements are generally treated as receipt and subsequent transfer
of the subject interest, rather than merely “stepping out of its way” as
per disclaimer conceptualization. This view thwarts their effectiveness
as a tool through which to reallocate a decedent’s estate for purposes of
such tax efficiencies as the marital deduction.146 Vested takers (or those
who negotiate on behalf of them) face a Hobson’s choice: refuse the
subject interest through disclaimer and be treated as never having received it for taxation or debt purposes, or rearrange the subject interest
(whether or not litigation is initiated or even contemplated) and accept
any desired consideration (or none) in exchange for it, along with exposure to taxing authorities and the rights of intervening creditors.147
144 Id. at 544-45; see, e.g., Jernigan v. Jernigan, 138 P.3d 539, 547 (Okla. 2006) (explaining that the law favors family settlements).
145 See, e.g., In re Estate of Ward, 23 P.3d 108, 109 (Ariz. App. 2001).
146 This is so for many reasons: first, disclaimers are barred once acceptance has occurred. See I.R.C. § 2518(b); 1 HARRIS N.Y. ESTATES: PROBATE ADMIN. & LITIGATION
§ 15:85 (6th ed. 2016). Second, disclaimers are not federally tax qualified if consideration
has been received. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1) (acceptance of consideration for
making the disclaimer is an acceptance of the benefits of the disclaimed property). Third,
disclaiming parties cannot direct where the disclaimed interest is to go. See HARRIS N.Y.
ESTATES: ESTATE PLANNING & TAXATION § 7:36 (6th ed. 2016). That task is the function
of the local law, and not any party agreement.
147 For example, Indiana codifies the family settlement by providing that compromise of estate matters “shall [not] in any way impair the rights of creditors or of taxing
authorities.” IND. CODE § 29-1-9-1 (2016). There is a jurisdictional split in the states over
whether state transfer taxes follow the will (which is the majority view) or the agreement.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Dunnick, 855 N.E.2d 1087, 1094 (Ind. T.C. 2006) (calling “wellestablished” the rule that family settlement agreements, while favored, cannot alter the
manner in which state inheritance taxes would be imposed and observing that one motivation behind the statute was to prevent families from “creating more beneficial tax postures” at the expense of state revenue); Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax
Div. v. Estate of Pickerill, 855 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (Ind. T.C. 2006) (same). Jurisdictions
taking the minority view seem emboldened in doing so when actual conflict or controversy motivated the settlement.
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Family settlement agreements bind all parties to them, and at least
directly, leaving unaffected the rights of those who have not agreed to
their terms.148 They may or may not include beneficiary or non-beneficiary children of parents who are parties to the agreement. For example, were decedent’s estate set to transfer 1/2 to Son A and the rest to Son
B, they could rearrange matters such that everything went to A, or perhaps A’s minor child, irrespective of whether there were other descendants of either A or B or not. In other words, A and B’s conduct would
loosely “bind” their descendants to the agreement’s terms in the same
way that any contract or other transfer of interest binds or affects others
who have no standing to object, even though they might suffer some
downstream, attenuated consequence of it.149 And just as any parent
may do what she will with property that she owns without securing the
advance approval of the conduct through her child’s guardian or the
court, all of this may be done with no independent assessment over
whether the agreement was in any minor’s best interests or not.150
Of course, minors who do have direct, actual interests in the decedent’s estate that are affected by an agreement should be represented by
a guardian (or protected through court approval) to safeguard their concerns.151 Otherwise, they may disavow the agreement upon reaching
the age of majority subject to such defenses as ratification and estoppel.152 Again the parent faces a dilemma: accept or disclaim on her
148 Compare Duncan v. Alewine, 255 S.E.2d 841, 845 (S.C. 1979) (stating that an
agreement binds those who are party to it) with In re Estate of McCrea, 380 A.2d 773,
775 (Pa. 1977) (stating that to be effective, an agreement must be binding on all of the
parties) and In re Estate of Outen, 336 S.E.2d 436, 437 (N.C. App. 1985) (stating that
agreements are invalid unless all who receive under the will join in the agreement). More
generally, family settlement agreements are normally upheld unless successfully challenged through such typical contract defenses as fraud or undue influence. Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to the Uses of Meditation and Other Forms of Dispute Resolution in
Probate, Trust, and Guardianship Matters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 645 (2000).
149 Compare the rights of creditors under fraudulent transfer or conveyancing acts.
150 “[A] court need not find that a proposed settlement is in the best interests of
minors and unborn and unknown heirs or beneficiaries under the will represented by a
guardian ad litem if the court instead finds that those parties in fact have no valid claim to
assert.” 80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 964 (2017) (citing Duncan, 255 S.E.2d at 845).
151 “Where the rights of a minor are involved, the court has the power to approve a
compromise negotiated by the guardian, guardian ad litem, next friend, or other legal
representative of the minor if the court finds the settlement to be in the best interests of
the minor.” Id.; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-1102(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010);
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 304 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (virtual representation).
152 The court is on firm ground when refusing to approve a compromise giving the
minor less than the minor would take as heir or under the will. See In re Beach’s Estate,
57 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1952); Ham v. Marshall, 196 N.E.2d 377, 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964).
See generally Cross, Family Settlement of Intestate Estate, supra note 142, at 223-24, § 22
(discussing the court’s holding in In re Beach’s Estate), 218-20, § 20 (discussing minors).
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own behalf, but now, also on her child’s. The question again becomes
whether it is possible to disclaim first, and then enter into a family settlement agreement on behalf of the minor child whose interest is solely
attributable to the parent’s initial disclaimer. But if it is a true agreement, rather than a subsequent dependent disclaimer, there would be no
tax benefit to that conduct. Interestingly, the extent to which a parent
may effectively bind a minor, non-heir child in this arena without oversight, but may not bind a minor to a dependent disclaimer without court
supervision, suggests either that (a) the court views the derivative, contingent interest in the minor as more worthy of protection than the interest of any minor whose parent is considering acting so as to reduce
property from the “family arena” or (b) the reluctance within the disclaimer arena might owe more to a desire to “punish” the parent for
seeking tax saving than the court might otherwise want to admit.
Ultimately, the question appears to be whether dependent disclaimers should be treated more like the advance, satisfaction, and release, or
the assignment or family settlement agreement. Admittedly, the answer
is difficult in that the disclaimer shares some features with each depending on timing and the nature of the interest itself. From one view, the
law seems more solicitous of the minor’s (as well as others’) rights when
the event takes place post-death, which is also when the interests normally vest.153 This would counsel treating the dependent disclaimer
similarly to the rules affecting a parent’s entry into a settlement agreement that was not in the child’s best interests. But timing cannot be
everything, and that cannot be the sole difference, because otherwise,
assignments (which occur before death and do not bind the descendant)
would be treated the same as releases, advances, and ademptions by
satisfaction. Indeed, the very fact that there is jurisdictional inconsistency over the actual extent to which advances bind the advancer’s descendants reveals that it could be one or the other, and that the preversus post timing feature is not entirely the salient one.
Under the other view, the law is not as concerned with the effect on
a child’s rights for “interests” that that child (and in fact, no one) yet
has, which explains the ease with which parents’ conduct can affect the
rights of those children in the advance and release contexts. Parents
may do what they like with their property without asking their children
first. Parents may do what they like with their “non-property” (e.g. release it) without asking their children first. Which is the dependent disclaimer more like? Indeed, which “should” it be more like? It would
seem that it should be treated more closely like the latter. If the interest
would not exist but for the parent’s conduct, then it is closer to non153 Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1999) (discussing creditors and channeling one’s inheritance to close relatives through disclaimer).
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property than to property, and should fall into the latter camp similarly
to any parental decision over what is in her own best interests. And if it
is subject to some sort of review, it should be very light indeed.
The difference could be found in what the common ancestor knows
and when, such that only if she has had a chance to react and adjust will
the child be bound by the parent’s conduct. That should not be the determinant, however, because decedents should know that their successors may always reject testate gifts. Had the intestate decedent or
testator been concerned about the effect of disclaiming on the disclaimant’s child, the decedent could have written a will with a robust disclaimer provision in it to address the issue. Absent that fact, who should
have the superior right? The parent is the better choice.
C. Tilt for Related Miscellaneous Reasons
For the true dependent disclaimer, no best interests review should
even be necessary and the conduct should be permitted as of right.
However, if it is, either because the jurisdiction thinks that there should
be no blanket rule against that review, the jurisdiction is concerned that
the interest disclaimed by the parent has now (or soon would) become
the interest of the child, or the interest was held directly in the child to
begin with, then the best interests review should be presumptively met
whenever the parent is acting on behalf of that child. This would not
technically be the same as a pro-forma determination, but should be
tilted toward favoring the parent’s chosen conduct. These factors stand
apart and in addition to recognizing the contingency of the minor’s resultant rights.
1. Interest Alignment
Dependent disclaimers will always involve at least two disclaimers
of all or part of the same property: the parent’s primary disclaimer of
her own right to acquire the property, followed by the parent’s secondary disclaimer of that same interest for the minor child in whom the
right to the initial disclaimed interest results. In neither instance does
the parent immediately, personally benefit,154 instead ceding her direct
rights right along with the child’s wholly derivative ones. For even if
true that “[c]onsiderations of kinship and familial affection should be
accorded little weight,”155 their cumulation with broader factors should
154 As could happen, e.g., were B to be A’s niece through a predeceased sibling who
acquired her right through intestate representation, direct testate bequest, or lapse.
155 See In re Estate of Guterman, 432 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 1980).

Fall 2016]

DEPENDENT DISCLAIMERS

199

counsel in favor of perceiving their interests to be similarly, sufficiently
aligned.156
Obviously, one can act improvidently on one’s own behalf the same
way one can on another’s, and two foolish disclaimers do not equal a
single wise choice. Nevertheless, leading by example suggests equitable
and considered decision-making. If it can be assumed that competent
actors are both self-interested and rational when calculating disclaimer
outcomes, and remembered that parents remain (presumably, consciously) legally responsible for their children’s welfare no matter what
they decide to do, then there is something undeniably compelling about
a parent’s willingness to do herself the very thing that she will press for
her children.157 Particularly after recalling that the child’s interest
would not even exist but for the parent’s predicate conduct, the purity of
motivation suggested by interest and relational alignment in turn suggests the efficiency and logic of presuming (if not conclusively accepting) that such disclaimers or petitions to disclaim have already
appropriately factored all concerns and interests, including those of the
child.
An entire theory is built around this basic premise in the litigationbased doctrine of virtual representation, where “[i]t is presumed that the
representor in pursuing his own economic self-interest must necessarily
protect the rights of the representees having the same interest.”158 Al156 A similar assertion should be made where, for example, A is the sibling and
guardian of incapacitated B, and disclaims on behalf of B and herself to get the property
to their shared ancestor.
157 While they cannot prove much of anything, adages can reinforce either the truth
of the underlying supposition or at least the perception of the truth of the underlying
supposition. For example, here it may be that what is good for the goose is not only good
for the gander, but perhaps for the gosling (and whole gaggle) as well.
158 Martin D. Begleiter, Serve the Cheerleader-Serve the World: An Analysis of Representation in Estate and Trust Proceedings and Under the Uniform Trust Code and Other
Modern Trust Codes, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 311, 319 (2008) (quoting In re
Estate of Putignano, 368 N.Y.S.2d 420, 424 (Sur. Ct. 1975)).
Under virtual representation, an interested party’s participation in a formal proceeding
or settlement might sufficiently safeguard and bind the interests of non-party others. Its
theoretical underpinnings include the tense dual recognition that while all necessary parties must be before the court to determine their rights, prompt, final, and binding issue
resolution is valuable for the judicial process. In result, rather than delaying matters until
the legal disabilities of interested minor, unborn, unascertained, or incapacitated persons
resolve (if ever), their participation and protection may be secured through virtual (or
obviously, actual) representation by parties with sufficient similarity of interest. Id. at
313-16.
Although the past twenty years have seen the expansion of virtual representation beyond
its common law parameters–most notably through the its codification within Article 7,
Part III of the Uniform Trust Code (judicial and non-judicial settlements; extends)–its
proper application remains questionable enough that many courts will simply appoint a
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though virtual representation does not appear to have ever been applied, directly, to disclaimers (dependent or otherwise),159 appreciable
similarity exists between that which is held by a child in whom the right
to a parent’s as-yet undisclaimed interest will result and that which is
held by either a permissible appointee or a taker in default under a
power of appointment.160 Each one of these “interests” owe their entire
guardian ad litem anyway to ensure that sufficient jurisdiction exists and that all parties
are bound. Id. at 327, 337-38; see also In re Estate of Silver, 340 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (Sur.
Ct. 1973) (noting, inter alia, that “virtual representation never assures the same finality of
decree [or freedom from potential conflicts of interest] as does representation by a guardian ad litem”); David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions
and Policy Issues, 67 MO. LAW REV. 143, 161 (2002) (observing that practitioners should
consider requesting GAL appointment where the potential for conflict exists. LORING &
ROUNDS, A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK 1123 (2016) (revealing the authors’ “suspicion” that
the doctrine “will not live up to the expectation of its codifiers[,]” and urging that the
doctrine “not be oversold”).
The analogy of virtual representation to disclaimer is imperfect in ways that both support
and undermine the comparison. For example, its application may be limited to a “formal
proceeding” or a settlement. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-403 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010)
(which, inter alia, permits a parent to represent a minor child if no conservator or guardian has been appointed). That a disclaimer is neither might make heightened rules over
permissible virtual representation irrelevant, except to the extent that, for example, a
petition for a limited guardianship so as to disclaim on behalf of a child were considered a
formal judicial proceeding. Alternatively, perhaps the lack of the judicial “check” provided when issues are brought before the court, coupled with the reduced need for dispatch for most voluntary, transactional undertakings, intimate that dependent disclaimers
are precisely the sort of matters to warrant the appointment of a guardian ad litem rather
than the less targeted representation offered by the doctrine. Of course, none of this is
necessary if the interest dependently disclaimed is deemed non-existent for the subject
purpose.
For an extraordinarily comprehensive treatment of the issue, see Susan T. Bart & Lyman
W. Welch, State Statutes on Virtual Representation–A New State Survey, 35 ACTEC L.J.
368, 368 (2010) (noting the continued expansion of virtual representation and “development into ever new uses and applications”).
159 Although the Uniform Probate Code adopts virtual representation principles in
section 1-403, neither those provisions nor the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests
Act (subsumed into Part 11 of the Uniform Probate Code, and which grants broad disclaiming authority to actual fiduciaries) explicitly speak to the interplay between the two.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 1-403; 2-1105 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). The same is true
for non-uniform statutory law, and case law. The only clear reference to treating the
issues together appears in a dated but prescient article suggesting that this particular sort
of “disclaimer by proxy” might be met with judicial disfavor. S. Alan Medlin, An Examination of Disclaimers Under UP[C] Section 2-801, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (1992).
160 A power of appointment is effectively nothing more than a donor’s grant of a
power to a donee to choose who should take the property subject to the power’s terms.
The power is “general” if it can be exercised by the donee/ “power holder” in favor of
that donee or her creditors, or that donee’s estate or its creditors; “non-general” (or
“special”) if these potential appointees are excluded from the permissible class. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1984); see
also I.R.C. §§ 2041(b), 2514(c). Again depending on its terms, a power may be exercisa-

Fall 2016]

DEPENDENT DISCLAIMERS

201

existence not to the decedent attached to the estate or the donor of the
appointment power, but rather to the made up mind, considered or capricious, of the party choosing whether to disclaim or appoint. The Restatement of Property allows the donee of a power of appointment to
represent permissible appointees, theorizing that the very possibility of
their acquisition is “so completely within” the donee’s “exercise of volition” that it is “reasonable to expect that any such object will receive all
the protection which his interest merits[.]”161 The Uniform Probate
Code and the Uniform Trust Code carry similar yet expanded
provisions.162
A quarter century ago, Professor Sheldon Kurtz urged a wider operational sphere for power holder representation through observations
acutely applicable to dependent disclaimers.163 After noting that the interests of both objects of appointment and takers in default “can be defeated [thus are subject to whether] the donee exercises a power,”164
and the “obvious justification . . . that the donee of a presently exercisable [general] power has an interest that is essentially equivalent to ownership,”165 he marshaled a description set of the power of appointment
to reveal the level of dominion and control wielded by its holder that far
exceeds a mere “agency,” no matter its general versus nongeneral or
present versus testamentary character:
1. Guidelines for the donee’s exercise of the power are broad;
2. The donee is not a fiduciary of the donor;
ble by the donee presently or only at death. Technically, the objects of appointment hold
but an expectancy in the subject property, as they will only take if an actual appointment
to them is made by the donee. By contrast, any takers in default of that appointment
hold a vested property interest, albeit one subject to divestment depending on the donee’s conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.2.
161 RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 181(c), 184(dd) (AM. LAW INST.
1936 & Supp. 1948).
162 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 302 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 1108, 1-403 (expanding the representation by power donees from objects of appointment
to include takers in default under a general testamentary power, at least where there is
no conflict of interest). See generally Ira Mark Bloom, Powers of Appointment Under the
Restatement (Third) of Property, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 755, 757-58 (2007) (explaining
how the draft by the American Law Institute for publication in the Restatement of Property affected estate planners and identifying aspect that needed clarification).
163 Sheldon F. Kurtz, Powers of Appointment Under the 1990 Uniform Probate Code:
What Was Done—What Remains to Be Done, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1151, 1153-60 & nn.10-45
(1992) (urging the extension of representation to include non-conflicted holders of nongeneral and testamentary powers on the theory that the donee effectively controls the
outcome for both takers in default (whose interests may be divested) as well as for the
expectancies held by objects of appointment).
164 Id. at 1155.
165 Id.
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3. The donee holds dispositive discretion over whether or not to
exercise the power;
4. The power is generally irrevocable unless its donor reserved
that right;
5. The donee might be able to impel certain conduct by the object
of appointment or taker in default;
6. The donor generally lacks a continuing interest in the appointive property;
7. The donee’s power does not terminate on the donor’s death;
and
8. Efficiency principles support permitting the donee to represent
objects and takers in default, “particularly . . . when the donee,
as is most likely, is an adult relative of the objects and takers in
default who are minors or unborn persons for whom a guardian
ad litem would otherwise have to be appointed.”166
The upshot for Professor Kurtz was that just as for the presently exercisable general power of appointment, decisions by the non-conflicted
holder of either a non-general or a testamentary power should also bind
takers and objects thereunder.
Every one of Professor Kurtz’s observations holds equally (if not
more) true when tested against the economic and relational interest between a parent with a disclaimable interest and a minor child to whom it
would thereby devolve. For example, the parent’s disclaimable interest
is not a “mere power,” however significant or robust. Its source has
died therefore may no longer revoke; its contours are driven by the objective law of, e.g., disclaimers, rather than channeled through that decedent’s ongoing wishes. It is an already vested property right that does
not depend on “general versus special” characterization or a decision to
appoint to self. There will be no conflict of interest as might exist, for
example, between a donee of a power of appointment who retains a
distinct, lifetime interest under a trust but who acts so as to affect the
potential remainder. The crux of the matter is that in no way is a legitimate heir to or beneficiary of an estate a mere “agent” of the decedent
who left it.
If a donee of a power – even, as Professor Kurtz urges, one who
may not appoint to herself or in any way benefit from the interest during
life – should be able to bind, say, a taker in default of appointment who
owns a vested (though divestible) interest in the appointive property,
surely a parent should be able to do the same for the interest that but
for her own disclaimer will never even fall to the child’s hands. For as
Professor Kurtz notes,
166

Id. at 1156-58.
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in many cases where the donee is an ancestor of either the objects or the takers in default, the donee would have a strong
desire to protect their financial interests. This interest also
warrants concluding that a donee should represent objects, takers in default, and others whose interests are subject to the
power, but only if the person represented is a descendant of
the donee.167
2. Saved Costs
Guardians do not always come cheaply, nor should they. Fairness
and functionality at individual and systemic levels often demand no
less.168 That should not suggest, however, that the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, a guardian “proper,” or a conservator is always optimal given the potential economic, temporal, and human costs associated
with their appointment169 and ongoing administration.170 It is truistic
167 Id. at 1158-59. It is a commonplace that without more, a close family relationship
is insufficient to bind a nonparty to a judgment. See Begleiter, supra note 158, at 362-67
(citing, inter alia, In re Dowsett Trust, 791 P.2 398, 402-03 (Haw. 1990) and 18 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4459 (2002)). Professor Begleiter explains the distinction between this reality and the common law’s willingness to allow parents to bring lawsuits on behalf of
their minor children by reminding of the economic investment, thus the “skin in the
game,” that the parent will have demonstrated by paying litigation and other costs in
even filing the action, as well as the insulation from tort exposure for breach of a duty to
that child unless the parent is also the child’s fiduciary. However, again this unique context allays some of those concerns in that the parent’s economic investment has already
been clearly established in the “giving up” of the disclaimed interest to begin with.
All of that being said, Uniform Trust Code section 303(6) indeed allows a parent “to
represent and bind the parent’s minor or unborn child if a [conservator] or [guardian] for
the child has not been appointed.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 303(6) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010) (a principle that also finds expression in the Uniform Probate Code). UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-403(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Whether that provision is novel, uncontroversial, or active, its very existence suggests some belief in the mere family
connectedness to support a child-binding role for a parent. See Begleiter, supra note 158
at 365-67 (citing English, supra note 158, at 160).
168 See Jean A. Mortland, Source of Trustee’s Fees; Guardian Ad Litem’s Fees, 12
EST. PLAN. 312, 313 (1985); Begleiter, supra note 54, at 672-73.
169 The estate may be charged with the court costs of guardianship appointment,
which might be particularly burdensome if significant effort was necessary to obtain it.
See Begleiter, supra note 54, at 678-80.
170 Guardians and guardians ad litem are entitled to reasonable compensation for
services rendered as well as fees incurred. In Friedman, for example, the court closed by
fixing the compensation for the GAL at roughly $2,000 after considering such traditional
factors as the nature, extent, necessity for, and actual time spent on the services, the
nature of the issue, the professional standing of the guardian, and the results achieved. In
re Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 847 (Sur. Ct. 2015) (citing In re Morris, 868 N.Y.S.2d 766
(Sup. Ct. 2008)). If the guardian is not a lawyer, fees associated with consulting one (or
other professionals such as accountants or tax specialists) may add up, especially if litiga-
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that lawyers often try to avoid guardianships in favor of some less expensive alternative.171 Indeed, it has been determined reversible error
to appoint a guardian although the testator’s will waived the need for
one, as to do so would “thwart the intention of the testatrix and result in
additional expense which the testatrix sought to avoid.”172 In a similar
vein, “the judge of probate should take into consideration, in determining whether to appoint a guardian ad litem, both the need for such appointment and the resulting expense.”173
Consider a minor whose parent petitions, either directly or through
a limited guardianship, to disclaim on his behalf. The more difficult and
involved the process, the greater the expense, particularly if cumbersome requirements control such decisions, numerous requests for approval are made, guardians are appointed, best interests analysis is
demanded, professional services are required, or litigation proceeds
through appellate levels. Although some costs will arise whether the
petition is granted or denied, that the former process would assuredly be
more streamlined and less costly than the latter militates toward granting it for this context and without unnecessary appointments or steps.174
Doing so would preserve the estate for heirs and beneficiaries rather
than divert it toward quasi-administrative personnel or judicial decisionmaking. Perhaps that explains why legislatures or courts tend to prefer
tion ensues. Additional compensation factors may include the amount of the ward’s estate and applicable statutory rates, but compensation that unduly burdens the estate may
be reduced. See generally Mortland, supra note 168, at 312-13 (discussing how the guardian’s compensation should be determined).
Although the amount of and payment source for fees is generally discretionary with the
appointing court, they are customarily charged against the estate rather than, e.g., the
interest of the ward or a litigating party. Begleiter, supra note 54, at 678-80.
171 As a past chair of the Taxation, Probate & Trust Section of the Idaho State Bar
has noted, “[t]he biggest complaint I hear in cases involving a GAL is the fees and expenses charged by the GAL . . . [t]he second reason for complaints about GAL fees and
costs is the amount charged.” Robert L. Aldridge, Practical Ethics and Professionalism of
the Guardian Ad Litem, 53 ADVOCATE 16, 17 (2010).
172 MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 4TH, supra note 14, at 558 n. 84 (quoting In re
Estate of Tate, 543 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1976)).
173 Gale B. Wilhelm, David R. Hermenze & Patricia L.R. Fowler, The Role of the
Guardian Ad Litem and Probate Proceedings, 65 CONN. B.J. 462, 463-64 (1991).
174 Courts are empowered to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor or
other necessary but unjoined party under state statute or court rules. Begleiter, supra
note 54, at 647. The power is commonly characterized as discretionary, perhaps in recognition that appointment would serve little purpose where a party either needs no protection, is actually represented (as through a guardian or a conservator), or is virtually
represented through a party’s identity of interest. Id. at 653-54. Moreover, at least according to one set of authors, “[t]he probate judge . . . could and often does reach the
same practical result [as would be effected by virtual representation] by appointing the
adult children as guardians ad litem to represent their own issue.” Wilhelm, Hermenze &
Fowler, supra note 173, at 465-66.
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the appearance and encourage the appointment of the parent, other natural guardian, or the person nominated.175 Nevertheless, the guardian
ad litem cannot have an adverse interest, which precludes relatives and
even parents as so acting if their interests conflict with that of the minor.176 Depending on how they are structurally viewed, this may complicate things for dependent disclaimers, particularly given the common
(although sometimes porous) prohibition on a guardian’s waiver of any
benefit to his ward or entry into any agreement that prejudices her.177
From the guardian’s perspective, the bird in the minor’s hand is
clearly better than any more speculative alternative, particularly given
that absent a 100% transfer tax rate, the money saved to the estate via
tax-driven disclaimers will always be lesser than the amount that the
disclaiming heir or beneficiary foregoes.178 Moreover, it may be perceived by the guardian as better for a child to effectively block the parent’s disclaimer in this way, if monies owned by a parent have a greater
chance of being given to or spent on the particular child than monies
owned by a grandparent who may have other expenses, other desires, or
ten other children or grandchildren to spend it on.
The difficulty could have been addressed ex ante. “Knowledgeable
estate planners prefer trusts to guardianship or conservatorship for minors or incapacitated adults,”179 and trustees may disclaim on behalf of
175 Begleiter, supra note 54, at 657 n. 80 (citing In re Holmyard’s Trust, 442 N.Y.S.2d
7 (App. Div. 1981)). As others have stated, “the parent of a minor child should be appointed as the child’s guardian, unless it is not in the best interests of the minor to do so.
Most probate judges apply a rule of practicality in these situations and tend to appoint
the parent to represent the child unless the amounts involved are large or the parent is
inexperienced in handling business and financial matters.” Wilhelm, Hermenze &
Fowler, supra note 173, at 465-66.
176 Begleiter, supra note 54, at 656-57.
177 Id. at 685.
178 For example, In re Estate of Azie, 694 N.Y.S.2d 912, 912 (Sur. Ct. 1999), reflects a
guardian’s attempt to disclaim 1/10 each of two $500,000 bequests left directly to the
decedent’s minor children, which would have saved taxes of $40,000. The court denied
the disclaimers, noting that they would have resulted in a “net loss” to the minors and
reminding that the benefit must accrue to the disclaimants, not to their parents or the
estate itself.
179 MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 4TH, supra note 14, at 389 (noting that most of
the benefits remain, with far fewer of the burdens). For example, protections exist for
both wards and beneficiaries through such elementary fiduciary standards as loyalty, prudence, and care. Trustees, however, have more flexibility to act free of judicial control,
and restrictions on guardians (e.g. to post bond) cannot generally be waived as easily as
may those on trustees.
Minors’ property may also be managed more effectively and efficiently than guardianship
through the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, which can apply to both lifetime and
deathtime transfers. Id. See also William M. McGovern, Jr., Trusts, Custodianships, and
Durable Powers of Attorney, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 17 (1992) (examining and
comparing assorted representational methods).
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the trust. For present purposes, however, that is a bit like saying that
there is no problem when there is no problem. Disclaimers generally
arise within post-mortem planning precisely because its pre-mortem
counterpart never took place.
None of this is to say, however, that decisions about the propriety,
identity or type of the guardian to be appointed should be made on
economics alone, or even that they are confined to the disclaimer context, as “[p]rotection of the best interests of the ward is not equivalent
to obtaining the best financial result.”180 Some instances might be even
stronger. For example, in In re Snide,181 spouses simultaneously executed mirror image wills bequeathing everything to the other on survival. With the husband’s death, however, came the realization that
they’d each signed the wrong document, leaving wills formalities unmet
and the spouse facing far less than the whole through an intestate share.
While two adult children waived their rights to the estate, a minor child
represented by a guardian ad litem refused to make the concession.
The reason for the guardian’s objection is apparent. Because
the will of [the husband] would pass the entire estate to [the
wife], the operation of the intestacy statute . . . [by denying
probate to the flawed instrument] is the only way in which the
minor child will receive a present share of the estate.182
Although the will was ultimately upheld through a narrow ad hoc exception,183 perhaps the associated costs of litigating the issue up through the
New York State Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York), including the family tension and stress that it may have caused on family
members and their relationships, could have been better spent, directly
or indirectly, on the minor child herself. For as a Florida court has wistfully expressed,
[w]e are not privy to the factors that the guardian ad litem considered in deciding not to consent to [the ward’s] classification
as a pretermitted child, a decision that deprived [her] of a
share in the estate and ultimately led to costly litigation. We
hope, however, that a guardian evaluating the facts of this case
would not focus strictly on the financial consequences for the
180 Begleiter, supra note 54, at 746 (supporting limits on GAL execution of settlement agreements, even though the result may be the ward’s inferior economic position, in
part by reminding that the conservatorship option exists and in part by asserting that if
the GAL is reprocessed as the child’s attorney, efficacy and advocacy are subject to testing through malpractice suit).
181 418 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1981).
182 Id. at 657.
183 Id. at 658.
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child, but would also consider such important factors as family
harmony and stability.184
Such benefits to the child, her sibling, the parents, and the entire
family are beyond cavil, particularly when coupled with, rather than reflexively cast against, the economic benefits that must necessarily exist
for any tax-driven disclaimer. Simplistically assuming a 10% transfer
tax rate, $1,000,000.00 held directly by the child is less, by one hundred
thousand dollars, than the $1,100,000.00 that could be sheltered for the
family were the disclaimer to occur. True, the child would no longer
own it directly, it instead likely being held by some other ancestor or
relative with no guarantee of direct or diffuse benefit flowing back to
the child’s hands. Nevertheless, disclaiming, for example, to get property into the hands of a grandparent spouse so as to ensure a marital
deduction suggests at least three things: first, the parent must have sufficient assets already or the primary disclaimer would probably not have
been made; second, the grandparent probably has or has just acquired
significant wealth as well or no tax effect by disclaiming would have
been possible; and third, given the natural (if overly simplified) order of
things, the grandparent is more likely to die sooner than the parent anyway, thus having less opportunity to spend down the assets and perhaps
with a long enough memory to enrich those who had earlier disclaimed
for her benefit.
Moreover, consider the alternative results where the dependent disclaimer is not permitted: (a) the parent never disclaims either; (b) therefore the child holds $0.00 directly anyway; (c) thus still has only indirect
rights, but now, in a lesser amount; (d) which may be as (if not more)
likely to be spent by the parent without ever reaching the child.185 Useful comparison might be made to rules purging “interested witnesses” of
their shares under a decedent’s will. If defined as those who take some
“beneficial interest” therein, one view might find interested witnesses
whenever the bequest exceeds the “nothing” that the testator could otherwise have chosen to bestow. But an equal (if not superior) view
would recognize that no testate share is beneficial when it falls below
that to which the taker would have been entitled had the will never been
made.186 In short, like most things, it is all a matter of perspective.
184

Espinosa v. Sparber, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1379 n.1 (Fla. 1993).
$10.00 can be spent more quickly than $11.00; either amount is more likely to be
spent down to zero by one with an extra generation or so to spend it.
186 See In re Estate of Morea, 645 N.Y.S.2d 1022, 1022 (Sur. Ct. 1996). At the risk of
extending the analogy beyond its usefulness, one might even compare the relativity of
that that which is “beneficial” to a party versus that which is “best.” The former, while a
far more forgiving standard than the latter, was deemed not met in Morea by interpreting
the term in a functional rather than strict way.
185
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Like their more formal and lasting fiduciary counterparts, guardians ad litem can be overly conservative and inflexible,187 even where
such benefit as family harmony and stability are clear to the ward and
her siblings alike. But nothing prevents the guardian from engaging an
even more far-ranging inquiry, beyond immediate economic effect: “In
making recommendations, the guardian ad litem may consider the general benefit accruing to living members of the individual’s family.”188
3. Decedent’s Wishes
Parties justifying a dependent disclaimer sometimes pitch its accordance with the decedent’s likely wishes, a difficult enterprise where the
decedent died intestate, and one not necessarily made easier where a
will exists.189 One response is indifference. The time for concern for
the decedent’s wants has passed; with death, those rights and controls
have been spent. On the heels of indifference come frustration and cynicism, the first with the decedent’s failure to plan and the second from
the opportunism found in post hoc self-interest.190 A court might perceive that petitioners are merely dressing their own desires in the
clothes of the dead. But a third, particularly where the “best interests”
question is close, might be regard–not, per se, for what the decedent
may have wanted or successors now hope to achieve, but rather in the
acknowledgment that a shared filial and familial perspective about one’s
last wishes–particularly if strong enough to actuate conduct–might
strengthen the bonds of survivors.
While the decedent’s intent (much less the shared or professed belief of interested parties over it) might seem irrelevant to the minor’s
best interests, subtle values exist. Mortals mere as they are, barring the
child’s disclaimer could prompt misplaced resentment in others who unconsciously or openly blame her. Depending on the child’s age, the
child might feel guilty or responsible for letting the others down. Conversely, a child permitted to disclaim could feel instrumental in strengthening family relations around a common goal, as where the subject
property held expressive or collective value that disclaimer would shield
187 See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trusts Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 621, 668 & n.243 (2004).
188 John B. Payne, Guardian Ad Litem, MICH. PROB. § 1:11.
189 For example, the family may aver that disclaiming would “carry out what they
believe would be Decedent’s wishes that her entire estate pass to her husband,” In re
Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 847 (Sur. Ct. 2015), or that the decedent “would have approved of the disclaimers because they were necessary to prevent the sale of [economically and personally valuable assets] by decedent’s estate.” Estate of Goree v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1994-331, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 123, 127 (1994).
190 The Friedman court appears to have experienced all three. See infra Part IV.A.
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from loss.191 Moreover, whether the property was technically “hers” to
disclaim or not, permitting disclaimer would reinforce to both the minor
and all involved the potential value in giving up that which, for whatever
reason, perhaps another should have, or in assessing immediate gains
against longer or broader views. Pure altruism is probably rare. But
even where motives are mixed, it is worthwhile to inculcate consideration for others with no expectation or entitlement in return, as well as
the value in greater good for the whole.
It might be ironic to rationalize dependent disclaimers as an antiself-interest principle, given that they are likely engineered as a tax
dodge. Moreover, the values described would be better instilled by either the parent or the minor accepting the property then simply handing
it over, subject to the possibility of consecutive taxation but thus arguably inuring to the public good. That might be asking a little much, however, especially if prudent asset management is an equally valid goal,
and the tax-free disclaimer is at least a first step.
Finally, the claim that “this is what the decedent would have
wanted” might even be true, which should count for something.
IV. DEPENDENT DISCLAIMER STRATEGY

AND

REFORM

Again, whether the disclaimer must work under state or federal law
depends on the goal sought. If the objective is to capture federal tax
benefits, the disclaimer must qualify under I.R.C. section 2518; otherwise, local law must be met.192

191 For example, in Goree, it appears that the “unique relationship” between the decedent’s extended family and estate assets, “including the families’ long-held philosophy
of retaining [stock in the family corporation] for the benefit of their descendants which
would inure to the benefit of decedent’s children,” was deemed relevant by both the
probate and appellate court. Goree, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 128.
192 Indeed, the enactment of I.R.C. section 2518 as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, which to some, “represent[ed] a quest for the holy grail of uniformity[,]” was in part
prompted by the predecessor provision which recognized the validity of a disclaimer
under federal law only if it had been valid under state law. See John H. Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 316, 322-23 (1979). The preenactment problem had been twofold given differences between federal law and state law
(where conflicting provisions were common, if not usual) and across states. That said, the
issue was not cured even under section 2518. Although it appears that unification was
the goal, bifurcation continues, most acutely seen through section 2518(b)(4) (relying
upon state law to determine where the disclaimed interest will pass, thus implicitly requiring that the disclaimer be effective under state law as well). As such, there continue
to be situations produced in which “a refusal satisfies one but not both laws.” Id. at 32334.
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A. Pre-Mortem
The Friedman court disallowed the dependent disclaimer. Toward
the close of the case, in a slightly caustic aside, the court shunted responsibility for the outcome:
It bears noting that this estate valued at $6,250,000.00 was not
the result of a wrongful death action of which the Decedent
would have had no knowledge or control over. Clearly Decedent who had the financial sophistication to amass over six million dollars in assets, had she wished to, could have executed a
will leaving everything to her husband.193
The court continued by observing that were decedent’s wishes as her
adult children averred, i.e. that everything pass to her surviving spouse,
her execution of a will would have made them clear, “obviat[ing] the
need for [the dependent disclaimer] application”194 (and correlatively,
all of its costs). The court closed: “Decedent having not executed a will,
the statutory distribution contained in [the applicable intestacy statute]
applies, with the concomitant tax consequences the distributees are now
seeking to avoid by engaging in what in effect is post death estate tax
planning.”195
However one feels about Friedman in result or rationale, its reminder is timeworn but true: there is no better corrective than
prevention.
1. When to Be Concerned
Lawyers with clients who have amassed wealth sufficient to raise
taxation concerns should encourage careful estate planning, perhaps
raising cases like Friedman where a single will sentence could have
saved roughly $200,000.196 Additional factors, particularly where cumulative, generate additional caution, the most notable being the likelihood of one of the following: a state estate or relationally variable
inheritance tax;197 the decedent or any descendants, heirs, or benefi193

In re Friedman, 7 N.Y.S.3d 845, 846 (Sur. Ct. 2015).
Id. at 847.
195 Id. It almost sounds as though the Friedman court views post-death estate planning as suspect, to be rooted out and cut off at the pass. Yet that is exactly what disclaimers usually are – post-death planning tools – as the Service will readily admit.
196 Id. For example, the dependent disclaimers attempted in another relatively recent New York case, where the minors on whose behalf they were sought were born after
the decedent’s intestate death, alleged that they would generate tax savings exceeding
$3,000,000. In re Guardianships of S.B.E., D.E., 824 N.Y.S.2d 758, 758 (Sur. Ct. 2006).
The guardian supported the disclaimers, and the court authorized them. Id.
197 Only Connecticut retains a state gift tax. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-642(a) (2017).
Very few states retain a state inheritance or estate tax. See e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS &
194
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ciaries leaving minor descendants of their own (whether currently heirs
apparent or not);198 weakened or complex relationships between decedent and other family members;199 an applicable intestacy scheme that
divides estate assets between the spouse and some other;200 assets that
hold particular “special” value; and non-existent (worse, an unhelpful
position within) case law or statute.201 Aside from the truism that a
well-planned estate might obviate the need for any disclaimer, dependent or otherwise, some component of each factor listed either heightens the import or utility of that plan or the difficulty of using disclaimer
as a later fix.
Although clearly more necessary when no planning took place,
post-mortem strategies may be equally useful when it was undertaken,
but poor. From the perspective of the marital deduction, the most basic
cure – “all to the spouse” – is insufficient, especially when the subject
will is susceptible to challenge on formalities, capacity, or other
grounds.202 Along with more general pre- and post- mortem planning
itself,203 particular care should be taken to consider expressly drafted
disclaimer provisions in even a validly executed will when the likelihood
of leaving either a minor beneficiary, a minor descendant of any benefiTRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8(a) (McKinney 2017) (discussing apportionment for the payment of
state and federal estate taxes).
198 This is an admittedly sweeping factor, capturing most every estate in its ambit.
Any human beneficiary might predecease the decedent, leaving minor descendants of her
own, no matter the age of the beneficiary when will is written or the question is posed.
199 Scenarios that do or may include potential descendants whose inheritance status
is unclear or factually complicated include non-marital children, posthumously conceived
and/or born children, adoption in or adoption out, or any arena where the possibility of a
will contest would be heightened were the decedent to validly execute it.
200 Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) with
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 213(B)(1) (2017). Under the former, a decedent’s surviving spouse
will take the entire estate if there are not also parents or sole descendants of the decedent. In other words, where all of the decedent’s descendants are also those of the surviving spouse, who has no other descendants of her or his own, the spouse will take
everything. Under Oklahoma law, spouse might share the decedent’s estate with the
decedents children, parents, and even siblings, depending on how estate assets are
characterized.
201 While it appears that the only identified jurisdictions with negative case law are
New York and New Jersey, Friedman’s recency could be persuasive in others.
202 Ironically, equal planning care should be taken, although perhaps for different
reasons, whether the jurisdiction is strict with formalities or forgiving. In the former,
more attempted wills will fail, sending the property through intestacy absent a prior valid
plan. In the latter, more attempted wills will survive, resulting in a greater number of
documents where their drafters failed to appreciate or address sound tax (or other aspect) planning.
203 Which, given that I claim no tax expertise, exceeds the scope of this paper.
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ciary,204 or a minor heir205 is high. Again, these triggers are especially
critical where complex or strained family relations exist.
The suggestion to “plan carefully” reads somewhat like a legal version of “run faster”: especially when malpractice looms, all of us would
if we could. But if the observer effect has merit, the reminder cannot
hurt. Moreover, the decedent’s very attempt to make her wishes
known, such as through an attempted transfer to a spouse, a testamentary request for a tax-sensitive read, or an overt request that the rights
of a child should yield to a parent’s concerns, might sway a court on the
fence over whether to agree.
2. What to Do About It
a) Planning (Subjective)
Numerous sources suggest tax-sensitive pre- and post-mortem estate planning strategies, and with far more sophistication than this article can attempt.206 But while many will focus on whether and how to
deploy a disclaimer,207 fewer discuss how to draft one.208 This is unfortunate, for a precise provision might anticipate and neutralize the dependent disclaimer conundrum. Aside from providing that disclaimed
interests should not follow anti-lapse analysis and instead shift to some
other such as a trust or the spouse, perhaps the provision could key
particular outcomes to disclaimer types, e.g. of what sorts of interests, by
whom and for whom, made for what purpose, and with what types of
results.209 A few examples follow:
Upon the parent’s election, where the effect of any disclaimer
would be to vest the disclaimed interest in the disclaimant’s
204 Beneficiaries may always predecease the decedent leaving minor descendants to
take through lapse or anti-lapse. It is also possible that the same will happen to a disclaimed interest, increasing the number of instances where minors could take. Much depends on the care with which disclaimer provisions are drafted and the jurisdiction’s
perspective on the anti-lapse statute.
205 Although well-drafted wills should include both detailed disclaimer provisions
and a detailed, perhaps integrated residuary clause, some property could end up passing
to minors nevertheless, as where the will fails to distribute 100% of the decedent’s estate;
the jurisdiction fails to recognize negative will provisions; there is either no residuary
clause, or a total lapse therein; there is a partial lapse in the residue, but the jurisdiction
follows the minority rule for its devolution; jurisdictional sympathy for wills challenges or
pretermitted heirs; jurisdictional stringency over in terrorem clauses.
206 See, e.g., JOHN R. PRICE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY
ESTATE PLANNING (2016).
207 See, e.g., id. §§ 12.32-.36.
208 None, it would seem, specifically target how one might be drafted within the dependent disclaimer context.
209 See supra Part III.B.1.
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minor descendants, the interest shall instead pass to my spouse,
or if predeceased, to my next closest adult beneficiary [with
priority given to the person (a) whose state inheritance tax is
set at the lowest percentage or (b) who will consult with the
parent who initially disclaimed over whether that individual
should also disclaim];
Where a minor child’s disclaimable interest arises solely as a
result of the parent’s decision to disclaim, I hereby empower
that parent to decide whether to disclaim that interest on behalf of the child without the need for approval by any other
person or court.210
I hereby direct that if any guardian be appointed by the court
to represent either the best interests or the property interest of
any minor beneficiary, such guardian shall strongly factor
broader familial interests, particularly the parents’ perspective,
rather than limit such focus to the individual on whose behalf
the disclaimer is sought. In making recommendations to the
court, this directive is particularly relevant when the minor’s
interest is dependent on the parent choosing to disclaim.
Such provisions might fly a little too close to the sun. Obviously,
they would not fix results for intestacy, and could be superfluous (if not
harmful) if the estate plan already maximizes tax efficiencies through
other means, such as through trusts reflecting broad and discretionary
trustee powers.211 But if most testators would rather maximize the control held by their actual beneficiaries than non-beneficiary relatives or
210 An even more aggressive attempt is found in a will clause that specifically permits
any parent to disclaim on behalf of any minor child, regardless of the direct versus dependent source of the minor’s interest. Although such breadth might undermine the view
that the minor’s interests are best protected through the court’s view of “best interests,”
perhaps the clause would be upheld: first, the law interposes few boundaries to testamentary freedom, and the testator may cut any person out completely anyway, minor or otherwise; second, similar discretion is upheld where, e.g., the parent is given a power of
attorney or named trustee for the minors or others; third, principles of virtual representation might be strengthened in both scope and force where there is a clear statement of
such intent; fourth, the disclaimant is still not technically directing the disclaimed property itself, but merely channeling it through the words of the will; and last, the context in
which “best interests” are normally assessed might be distinguishable as focusing more
on custody, care and abuse issues than economic ones. Even in that arena, the guardian
named in the parent or parents’ will, while not determinative, is given a fair amount of
deference.
211 One method to do so would have been to avoid individual bequests, instead leaving the interest to a trust over which the trustee would hold broad distributive and disclaiming authority, and where decisions would need to be made in light of the trust’s and
all beneficiaries’ broader interests, rather than with focus on an individual beneficiary’s
concerns.
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courts, and if most courts are willing to pay more than lip service to
testator intent, then just maybe such clauses could work.
Testamentary freedom holds the main key. Property law permits all
manner of conditional or qualified gifts, a category that may loosely be
said to include defeasible, divestible, contingent, and springing interests,
equitable elections, and forfeitable estates. Moreover, outright disinheritance of anyone (including one’s minor children) is already permissible.
There would seem to be little policy bar to a clause under which takers,
especially those whose very interest rests wholly on another’s predicate
decision, would be preemptively barred at the parent’s (or other’s) election. As these matters would be pre-arranged by that testator, neither
the decision to disclaim nor the outcome of disclaiming would be inappropriately determined, per se, by either the disclaimant or the person
making the disclaimer. From this angle, the court would be effecting
such postmortem interest shifting as nothing more than the legitimate
consequence of an earlier testamentary plan.212
Compare the unlikely scenario under which all expectancy holders
but the spouse were to release their interests moments before the decedent’s death. Assuming that they could time things just so, release
would bind all descendants and the property would pass to the surviving
spouse without the need for expensive “best interests” questions or potentially adverse answers.213 It seems curious to countenance this result
one second before the decedent’s death but summarily reject it one second after.
Escheat, or the “falling back” to the state of a decedent’s estate
upon failure of beneficiaries or heirs,214 offers a similarly supportive
conception. Escheat is a modern complement to the feudal tax, and is
something, like modern estate taxes, that estates seek to avoid. Although escheat is universally recognized, and although easily sidestepped through the simple expedient of a valid will, some jurisdictions
have softened other rules to sidestep its application.215 Similarly, a
212

See Martin, supra note 192, at 343.
Obviously, the releasors would need to be certain that the jurisdiction recognized
the release and that all jurisdictional requirements (such as consideration) had been met,
that the outcome could be predicted, and of course, that the testator predeceased them
(or at least, the other spouse).
214 See generally In re O’Connor’s Estate, 252 N.W. 826, 827 (Neb. 1934) (defining
the term “escheat”); Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and
the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 621 (2000) (explaining that if
the term “escheat” is used correctly, it cannot be forced).
215 For example, some jurisdictions that might otherwise effect a negative will clause
might refuse to do so where escheat would result, as might courts faced with a close call
over the validity of a will or the applicability of the doctrine of equitable adoption.
213
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clause that seeks broadened dependent disclaimers might be seen as related enough to secure a forgiving judicial stance on its exercise.
b) Legislation (Objective)
All of that said, policy premiums should not rest on expensive anticipatory planning but on their own grounds, particularly when intestate death remains common. Rather, default rules are egalitarian,
serving everyone irrespective of estate planning access. Unless the design has always been to capture an estate tax whenever possible–which
could not be the case given ongoing exceptions and exemptions, credits
and shields–perhaps the better answer rests with disclaimer legislation
than with private ordering. It is less surprising that a few such statutes
exist than that more jurisdictions have not followed suit.
The legislation should be clear. For example, a statute providing
that effective disclaimers bind the beneficiary, and all persons claiming
by, through or under him, was read not to bar the shift of the disclaimed
interest to the disclaimant’s descendants through representation,216 an
interpretation that effectively meant that the descendants could not disavow that the disclaimer had happened rather than that it also removed
the property from their hands. Somewhat more directly, a Minnesota
law states that a fiduciary (such as a personal representative, trustee, or
conservator) may disclaim without court approval if the instrument creating the relationship explicitly granted that right.217 Although the
same provision requires court approval before a custodial parent may
disclaim on behalf of a minor for whom no conservator has been appointed, it could be successfully employed to achieve a similar end.218
216 MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH 4TH, supra note 14, at 94 n.58 (citing, inter alia,
Estate of Bryant v. Bryant, 196 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (Ct. App. 1983)). For three additional
examples using virtually identical language, see IDAHO CODE § 15-2-801(6) (2010) (“The
renunciation or the written waiver of the right to renounce is binding upon the person
renouncing or person waiving and all persons claiming through or under him.”); ME.
STAT. tit. 18-a, § 2-801(f)(3) (2017) (“The renunciation or the written waiver of the right
to disclaim is binding upon the person renouncing or waiving and upon all persons claiming through or under him.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:25-47 (West 2017) (“The disclaimer or
the written waiver of the right to disclaim shall be binding upon the disclaimant or person
waiving and all persons claiming by, through or under him.”).
217 MINN. STAT. § 524.2-1107(b) (2017).
218 First, a savvy testator could take care to name the likely affected parent as the
fiduciary (such as executor) as well, and therefore gain the benefit of the more forgiving
standard. Second, the court, while perhaps not accepting the determination wholesale,
might be inclined to permit the parent’s disclaimer on behalf of the minor with only slight
review were the will to attempt to provide this right explicitly. See, e.g., In re DuPont, 194
A.2d 309, 317 (Del. Ch. 1963) (recognizing that an authorized guardian of an incapacitated person might be permitted to make gifts of the ward’s property under the thinking
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Six identified state statutes explicitly address the issue and seem to
dispense with any “best interests” demands. All of them are limited to
situations where no court-appointed guardian exists, thus presumably
where no concerning prior or contemporaneous facts have occasioned
the need to appoint one. Limited differences appear in terms of who
may then do the disclaiming, with additional differences as described
below.
Statutory Version A
In the absence of a court-appointed guardian . . . without court
approval, a natural guardian . . . may disclaim on behalf of a
minor child of the natural guardian, in whole or in part, any
interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment, which the minor child is to receive solely as a result
of another disclaimer, but only if the disclaimed interest or
power does not pass to or for the benefit of the natural guardian as a result of the disclaimer.219
Statutory Version B
A custodial parent of a minor for whom no guardian of the
property has been appointed may disclaim, in whole or in part,
an interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment, that, but for the custodial parent’s disclaimer,
would have passed to the minor as the result of another
disclaimer.220
Statutory Version C
A parent of a minor for whom no general guardian or guardian
of the estate has been appointed may renounce, in whole or in
part, an interest in or power over property (including a power
of appointment) that would have passed to the minor as the
result of that parent’s renunciation.221
Version A enhances the natural guardian’s power to effect a dependent
disclaimer when (a) the interest thereby disclaimed was generated by
any other disclaimer made by any person (presumably including the natural guardian) and (b) would not inure to or for the benefit of that natuthat such gifts may be beneficial to the ward. Although a disclaimer is not a gift, the
analogy exists.).
219 FLA. STAT. § 739.104(2) (2017); see also ALASKA STAT. § 13.70.030(b)(2) (2016)
(virtually identical provision, substituting “individual having legal custody” for “natural
guardian”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-801(e)(4) (2016) (virtually identical provision, substituting “parent” for natural guardian and adding “or unborn issue” to minor child); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 240.008(e) (West 2015) (virtually identical provision).
220 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2603 (2016).
221 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31B-1(d) (2017).
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ral guardian. By slight contrast, Version B permits custodial parents to
effect dependent disclaimers whenever the interest thereby disclaimed
was generated by any other disclaimer, without expressly limiting the
right of the custodial parent to benefit thereby. Version C, perhaps the
most limiting, permits the minor’s parent to dependently disclaim only if
the subject interest had arisen solely because of that particular parent’s
initial disclaimer. By necessity, the interest will not redound to the parent’s benefit given that the parent has already disclaimed it.
Assessing these statutes against Examples 1-10 from Part III.B.1,
supra, illuminates that these distinctions would probably be fairly minor
in application.222
1. A disclaims an intestate inheritance descending to A from
X’s estate.
2. A disclaims a testate bequest or devise made to A under
T’s will.
None of the versions apply because A is disclaiming for self an interest
to which A directly succeeded.
3. A disclaims an intestate inheritance descending to B from
X’s estate, and the property will instead pass to C.
4. A disclaims a testate bequest or devise made to B under
T’s will, and the property will instead pass to C.
None of the versions apply because A is disclaiming for B an interest to
which B directly succeeded. B’s interest was not solely due to “any
other disclaimer.”
5. A disclaims an intestate inheritance descending to B from
X’s estate, and the property will instead pass to A.
6. A disclaims a testate bequest or devise made to B under
T’s will, and the property will instead pass to A.
None of the versions apply because A is disclaiming for B an interest to
which B directly succeeded. B’s interest was not solely due to “any
other disclaimer.” Additionally, Version A also does not apply because
A will thereafter benefit from the disclaimer.
7. A, lone heir to X’s intestate estate, having not yet disclaimed her intestate interest, disclaims on behalf of her minor child, B.
222 Note that I have not, however, assessed whether enacting jurisdictions have retained the older distinction between renunciations of intestate interests and disclaimers
of testate ones. Moreover, the examples do not reflect the extent to which the parent
may disclaim an interest to which the child would have been entitled through some other,
non-parental disclaimer (such as that of a sibling, uncle, or cousin).
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8. A, sole beneficiary under X’s testate estate, having not yet
disclaimed her testate interest, disclaims on behalf of her minor child, B.
All three versions apply because B’s interest would be entirely dependent on “another disclaimer” (which would satisfy Versions A and B)
and that disclaimer would have been made by one of B’s parent, A
(which would satisfy Version C).
It is unclear whether the timing of the disclaimers, i.e. the fact that
A is anticipatorily disclaiming for her child without first having done so
herself, is important. Version A speaks in future terms by covering the
interest “which the minor child is to receive” solely because of the other
disclaimer, whereas Version B intimates the past tense by referring to
the other disclaimer as having already been made.
9. A, heir to X’s intestate estate, disclaims her intestate interest, and then disclaims the interest that thereby passes by
representation to her minor child, B.
10. A, beneficiary under X’s testate estate, disclaims her testate interest, and then disclaims the interest that thereby
passed through a disclaimer provision, anti-lapse principles, the residuary clause, or intestacy to her minor child,
B.
All three versions apply because B’s interest would be entirely dependent on “another disclaimer” (which would satisfy Versions A and B)
and that disclaimer would have been one of B’s parent, A (which would
satisfy Version C). As with Examples 7 and 8, it is unclear whether the
ordering of the disclaimers matters.
Differently applied, reconsider the essential facts of Friedman,
where decedent’s adult daughter attempted to condition the validity of
her own disclaimer on that of her infant child’s as well. The dependent
disclaimer would have been valid under all statutory schemes. The Goree analysis would have differed, however: there, the interests that the
mother disclaimed on behalf of her minor children had passed to them
directly through intestacy, rather than as the result of any person’s disclaimer. Moreover, those disclaimers resulted in the mother actually
taking the property herself under the applicable intestacy scheme, which
would have violated the proscription in Version A.
Somewhat by necessity, default statutes can only do so much. But
as with any arena where subjective intent can be rather cheaply and
easily expressed, perhaps more finely tuned statutory precision would
ask too much of legislation with insufficient value in return.
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B. Post-Mortem
That a decedent has died does not mean that estate planning must
end. Post mortem planning, or “the opportunity to reorder the distribution of property free of tax [, as through disclaimer,] is one of the most
important tools available to the estate planner.”223 Part III explored the
potential push back for dependent disclaimers and highlighted the sorts
of arguments one might make to support them: the “disclaimed interest” does not really exist; analogs support its effectiveness; “best interests,” if necessary, can still be met. Aside from their use to further predeath success at either the macro legislative level or an individualized
estate basis, most of those arguments would be made in the postmortem period when trying to convince guardians and courts to approve
the dependent disclaimer.
That said, holistic estate planning and probate might optimize the
chance that a dependent disclaimer will work, perhaps even earlier and
with less expense. For example, the parent seeking to disclaim on behalf
of the minor could request that those with an interest in the decedent’s
estate – whether existing or potential – meet to discuss matters directly
before any petitions or disclaimers were sought. The impetus to attend
would presumably increase exponentially were an estate plan that attempted to mandate participation or precondition distribution already
in place. But whether or not there were, the opportunities that such
informal discussions hold for enhancing the outcome quality at individual and systemic levels – benefits that include efficiency, privacy, reduced costs, and improved family relationships – are too great to
discount prematurely, particularly if the likelihood of contest is high or
where unique requests, such as dependent disclaimers, exist:224
223

PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 12, § 12.32.
The existing scholarship covers this issue with pragmatism and theoretical nuance.
Although I am certain that other equally useful treatment exists, the following sources
are invaluable for understanding the utility of alternative resolution models within planning and probate contexts: MEDIATION FOR ESTATE PLANNERS: MANAGING FAMILY
CONFLICT (Susan N. Gary, ed., 2016); Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing Estate and Trust
Litigation Through Disclosure, in Terrorem Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration, 36 ACTEC L.J. 547 (2010); Ronald Chester, Less Law but More Justice?: Jury Trials and Mediation as a Means of Resolving Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 173 (1999);
Roselyn L. Friedman & Erica E. Lord, Using Facilitative Mediation in a Changing Estate
Planning Practice, 32 EST. PLAN. 15 (2005); Susan N. Gary, Mediating Probate Disputes,
13 PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 1999, at 11; Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using
Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 397 (1997); Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money:
Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539 (2008);
Ray D. Madoff, Probate Disputes: A Study of Court Sponsored Programs, 38 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2004); Radford, supra note 148; Robert N. Sacks, Mediation: An
Effective Method to Resolve Estate and Trust Disputes, 27 EST. PLAN. 210 (2000).
224
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[I]f a family dispute actually reaches litigation, irreparable
harm to the family relationship may be unavoidable. In recognition of this sad possibility, the utilization of mediation, or
“process consultation,” as a “preemptive strike against potential litigation” has begun to take root in the community of lawyers and other estate planners.”225
ADR methods could be profitably employed in ranging ways, including within the planning process itself. Specific to the present postmortem issue, discussions could be useful, inter alia, in identifying appropriate guardians or fiduciaries for minors or assessing assorted possibilities for and potential results of single, numerous, or conditional
disclaimers.226 A critical component of the discussion would target the
wisdom of proposed disclaimers vis-a-vis the estate, the family, successors, and potential disclaimants. While the determination of whether a
proposed disclaimer served a particular minor’s best interests may well
be one for the court to make, the support of the rest of the family would
seem, at the least, to be relevant.227
The impediment to disclaiming on behalf of a minor was traditionally all about money. As Professor John McCord cautioned soon after
section 2518 was enacted, guardians attempting to do so faced a “practical dilemma,” as he anticipated that state courts would but rarely approve such an act “run[ning] counter to” the duty to conserve, and
protect, the property of the ward, particularly if the motivation was tax
planning.228 He thus found a certain elegance in the decision to toll
disclaimer time limits until minors reached age twenty-one. But as he
implicitly recognized, avoiding one difficulty created others.
One potential solution rests with the ability to set aside some sum
for the minor’s benefit, perhaps tied to the amount disclaimed, the taxes
saved, or the present interest generated by either.229 The most obvious
impediment to such a plan would be that consideration generally disqualifies the attempted disclaimer for taxation and perhaps other pur225

Radford, supra note 148, at 646 (citations omitted).
Nothing suggests that these meetings could not take place after the appointment
of a guardian, ad litem or otherwise, given the guardian’s obligation to investigate and
become informed over all relevant matters. See Begleiter, supra note 54, at 663-64 (discussing the duty to investigate).
227 See, e.g., supra note 184 and accompanying text.
228 JOHN H. MCCORD, 1976 ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REFORM: ANALYSIS, EXPLANATION AND COMMENTARY § 5.28(3) (1977).
229 Optimally, the funds would be placed in trust, with terms that would best suit the
needs of the parties, perhaps including mandatory termination and principal distribution
payout to the minor upon reaching a certain age.
226
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poses.230 Such a quid pro quo could be viewed as akin to interest
receipt and later transfer, the antithesis of what valid disclaimers
achieve, or the judicially favored, but tax-consequence-agnostic, family
settlement. Nevertheless, it is unclear (although likely) whether all state
laws would proscribe such a condition.231 Moreover, it may be possible
legally to maneuver the concern at the federal level as well.
The court spoke to this issue in In re Estate of De Domenico.232
There, the petitioner/surviving spouse sought an order authorizing disclaimers on behalf of her minor children. After noting that she would
not be permitted to do so unless such action directly advantaged those
children, the court continued:
[E]ven should petitioner agree to use the renounced funds
solely for her children’s benefit, and the court were to permit
such an agreement, such a commitment would invalidate the
renunciation for Federal and New York estate tax purposes,
since the respective tax laws require that a renouncing party
may not serve his own interests or receive any benefits by virtue of the disclaimer.233
Effectively, the mother was put to a choice: establish “best interests”
through consideration but eviscerate tax qualification, or back off the
disclaimer and pay the tax debt. Whether a third way was possible,
neither offered choice seemed palatable.
230 See Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(1) (1986); Estate of Allen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1990-514, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 904 (1990); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 619, 62627 (1987); In re Estate of Carucci, 769 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (Sur. Ct. 2003). In Carucci, the
dependent disclaimer was challenged, in part on the theory that petitioner’s plan to create a trust funded at a higher amount than his children would otherwise take were they
not to disclaim would disqualify it. Although noting the “paucity of reported decisions
where the courts have authorized the payment of consideration on behalf of an infant or
an adult in exchange for a renunciation,” the court denied the petition. Id. at 869. The
case is distinguishable, however, on the theory that the children’s interests had been bequeathed to them directly and thus the petitioner’s plan would seriously alter the decedent’s testamentary disposition.
231 Like federal law, “[s]tate laws generally require a disclaimer to be made without
consideration.” PRICE & DONALDSON, supra note 12, § 12.32. But see, e.g., NY EST.
POWERS & TRUST LAW § 2-1.11 (McKinney 2014) (explaining that a party may receive
consideration for a renunciation if payment of such consideration has been authorized by
the court). Of course, that might simply be demanded so that the court may perform
informed best interests analysis or assess whether the disclaimer is actually a contract for
which no tax advantage may be secured (which is irrelevant anyway, depending on the
amount of the estate for federal tax purposes and jurisdiction’s retention of a state estate
tax).
232 418 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sur. Ct. 1979).
233 Id. at 1013 (citations omitted).
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A critical distinction exists. In De Domenico, the interest sought to
be disclaimed was directly held by the minors, not turning on the
mother’s disclaimer at all. The most obvious sidestep for dependent disclaimers is simply to remind that the minor would be getting something
for nothing. In other words, if the minor’s interest would not exist but
for the parent’s disclaimer, then it is closer to non-property than property. Therefore, its “disclaimer” need not be justified by best interests
at all, and any “consideration” paid to make it would actually just be a
pure gift from the others to the minor for whom the disclaimer was
made.234 Realistically, adults could have simply talked it out none the
wiser.
Lest that sound too strategic and inviting of fraud, consider how
Estate of Monroe v. Commissioner235 informs the analysis. Decedent
left a multimillion dollar estate and numerous cash bequests to assorted
family members and others. Her surviving spouse determined the potency of disclaimers (under which the property would pass to him) to
reducing the federal tax liability generated by the estate.236 He procured almost $1,000,000 worth of disclaimers from the legatees approached, allegedly careful “not to promise anything in return” and
clarifying the absolute voluntariness of disclaimants’ action.237 Within
weeks, Spouse gave each disclaimant a gift approximating the gross
amount of each interest disclaimed.238
The Commissioner asserted, and the Tax Court agreed, that the disclaimers were not qualified for federal tax purposes on a blurred and
blended theory of I.R.C. section 2518: that they were not “irrevocable
and unqualified” and that there had been an acceptance of the interest
or its benefits. To the Tax Court, although “explicit negotiation or bargained-for exchange of consideration” may not have existed, implied
promise could be found in disclaimants’ alleged expectation of recouping value in some form from Spouse239 and concern over the economic
consequence of refusing his request.240
234 By analogy, consider the takings treatment of assorted future interests. Beyond
the most vested, and “evaluable,” as with a reversion following a short term of years,
most courts will say that the interest is simply too speculative to warrant any compensation beyond nominal for its acquisition. Cf. Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. Nueces Cty, 736
S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1987) (permitting greater compensation for a possibility of reverter
which looked to be imminent to occur). If such actual (although speculative) existing
interests warrant such little protection, what protection, if any, should be afforded the
non-property interest at issue here?
235 124 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1997).
236 Id. at 702.
237 Id. at 705.
238 Id. at 703.
239 Id. at 703-04.
240 Id. at 705.
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The Tax Court was reversed on appeal. To the Monroe court, section 2518(b), as refined by the relevant treasury regulations,241 reflected
two avenues for disqualifying the disclaimer: acceptance of its benefits
before disclaiming, or receiving consideration afterward. On the first
route, there was neither allegation nor suggestion that disclaimants had
accepted their legacies before they disclaimed them. As for the second,
the court remonstrated that one’s belief that she might be a beneficiary
is “not consideration absent an actual promise or agreement” to provide
it. The court’s observation makes perfect sense. Consideration is property, or value in goods or services. If a mere expectancy–even one created under a known will or as apparent heir–is not property, then a
more diffuse belief in the potential to be a donee, not under an existing
instrument, will, or statute, should certainly not be either. To hold to
the contrary would flirt with a dangerous date.
If refusing to equate hopes with interests creates too much concern
over back-room deals and fraud on the Service, a more direct response
would abolish disclaimers, abolish the tax deductions that inspire them,
or sever the linkage between the two.242 Aside from how any of that
might fare in the capitol or the courts, it is unlikely (at least for now)
that the political willingness exists to do so, and far more likely that
instead it all becomes moot with repeal of the estate tax. Alternatively,
Congress could provide that like spouses,243 minors should enjoy an exception under section 2518 through which protective benefits generated

241 Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(1) (1986) (“A qualified disclaimer cannot be made with
respect to an interest in property if the disclaimant has accepted the interest or any of its
benefits, expressly or impliedly, prior to making the disclaimer. Acceptance is manifested by an affirmative act which is consistent with ownership of the interest in property. . . . In addition, the acceptance of any consideration in return for making the
disclaimer is an acceptance of the benefits of the entire interest disclaimed.”). The examples seem to support this argument - they are all about acts of acceptance, etc., and none
of them reflect the type of fact pattern here presented.
242 If wealth transfer tax is meant to disaggregate wealth and raise revenue, perhaps
achieving deduction benefits should at least be more difficult to accomplish than it currently is. While this approach could tighten the arenas in which any disclaimer (dependent or otherwise) could achieve tax efficiencies, the true dependent disclaimer should
remain immune given the expectancy status of the subject interest. On the role of tax
policy, deduction, and reform, see Joseph M. Dodge, Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer
Tax Reform: Retained-Interest Transfers, Generation-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation
Discounts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 999, 999 (2016).
243 See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to
Marriage and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 783 (2004) (acknowledging that a surviving spouse’s disclaimer survives section 2518 scrutiny notwithstanding
that spouses may benefit from that disclaimer).
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by otherwise valid disclaimers would not disqualify matters for taxation
purposes.244
Candor enhances trust, enhanced trust improves information, improved information enhances outcomes and reduces the likelihood of
family discord. If, as the Monroe court stated, the “primary purpose of
law regarding qualified disclaimers is to facilitate post-mortem estate tax
planning and increase family wealth on the ‘expectation’ that there will
thus remain more wealth to pass on to disclaimants in the future,”245
then one might question what real harm exists in safeguarding those
disclaimers even more tied to that expectation and the admitted hopes
that inform them.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the context within which the dependent disclaimer will
fall makes it seem like a “rich person’s problem,” rare in actual sighting
and curable with a modicum of insight and planning available to anyone
of means.
Few states retain estate taxes.246 For a federally driven disclaimer
to occur, the estate will need to contain more than roughly five and onehalf million dollars. Even then, other forms of tax planning might already have reduced the resultant tax hit. One would think that most
families that have accumulated the level of wealth to even fret over the
issue would have long ago handled things on the front end. After all,
least cost avoiders begging judicial rescue from an economic effect of
their own making risk the sort of blasé reaction that the Friedman court
showed: “too bad, plan better.” Moreover, factoring ever-increasing exemption amounts and portability with the continued demise of state
wealth transfer taxes and the continuing threat to federal ones suggests
that for practical purposes, the issue may soon become moot.
All of that said, such situations exist. And as long as people continue to die intestate or with wills that falter in form or effect, postmortem estate planning will continue with the central role of the disclaimer intact.
But dependent disclaimers raise more critical issues about far more
critical things. They invite foundational questions over the nature and
scope of property – including the point at which mere potential solidifies
244 Millie Baumbusch, Thanks, but No Thanks: Making Qualified Disclaimers on Behalf of Minors, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 960-61 (2007) (constructing a compelling
argument for why this should be the case).
245 Estate of Monroe v. Comm’r, 124 F.3d 699, 709 (5th Cir. 1997).
246 See Scott Drenkard & Richard Borean, Does Your State Have an Estate or Inheritance Tax?, TAX FOUND. (May 5, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/does-your-state-haveestate-or-inheritance-tax.
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into right, becoming an interest for which transfer demands direct compensation before minors’ best interests are served. They correlatively
prompt consideration over best interests, where assessors too often retreat from messy questions raised to the more sterile court game of costs
versus benefits. Asking what is in the best interests of minors and the
families that shelter and house them is one of the most important tasks
that the law can undertake. But to press dependent disclaimers into
service in reaching an answer disserves both the answer and the question itself.
All of these factors circle back to core issues. At least where the
dependent disclaimer is tax-driven, a parent will not disclaim if the child
cannot, and the child cannot disclaim if the parent does not. Thus,
whenever a court thwarts the minor’s dependent disclaimer, it is actually
the parent’s right to disclaim that is functionally barred,247 the parent’s
interests that are being affected, and the parent who is forced to accept
property no matter how “absurd” that suggestion may be.248
Traditional principles are threatened when the law starts demanding best interests analysis before a child can “give up” that to which she
is not even entitled.249 What, then, of a parent’s decision to convert an
entailed fee into an absolute one,250 or sever a joint tenancy held with a
child,251 or fail to pursue an elective share against the estate of a spouse
who disinherited her,252 or write, change, or revoke a will in a manner
reducing her take?253 Indeed, what of a parent’s decision to seek a degree, buy risky stock, donate to charity, or spend money at all other than
on the child? For as the child’s “rights” in such arenas expand, the parents’ by necessity shrink, leaving law in the difficult position of explaining just how the indefinable turned into some form of property, and
money became a proxy for care.

247 I admit that the “functional” modifier is telling. The parent can still legally disclaim. It is simply that for practical purposes, she will not, because she has lost the whole
motivation for doing so.
248 And “the law is certainly not so absurd as to force a man to take an estate against
his will.” Martin, supra note 192, at 316 (quoting Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. 575,
576-77 (K.B. 1819) (Abbot, C.J.)).
249 As odd as requiring a parent to pay the child for the child’s release of an expectancy to the parent.
250 Which would destroy the tail to the detriment of descendants.
251 Which would destroy the right of survivorship, or potential to survive to the
whole.
252 Which would destroy any hope of the child to gain from the interest thereby
waived.
253 Which could disinherit the child completely at the absolute wish of the parent.

